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TOUGH ON CRIME (ON THE STATE’S DIME): 
HOW VIOLENT CRIME DOES NOT DRIVE 
CALIFORNIA COUNTIES’ INCARCERATION 
RATES—AND WHY IT SHOULD 
W. David Ball* 
 
Abstract 
 
California’s prisons are dangerously and unconstitutionally 
overcrowded; as a result of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Plata v. Schwarzenegger, the state must act to reduce its prison 
population or face court-ordered prisoner releases. The state’s plans 
to reduce overcrowding are centered around what it calls criminal 
justice “realignment,” whereby California will divert some sentenced 
offenders away from state facilities towards county facilities. The 
plan faces opposition from county officials, who argue that the state 
is pushing its problem onto the counties. 
But what if the counties are actually responsible for state prison 
overcrowding? I argue that California’s prison overcrowding is due 
in large part to county decisions about how to deal with crime. Using 
data from 2000-2009, I show that California’s counties use state 
prison resources at dramatically different rates, and, moreover, that 
the counties which use state prisons the most have below-average 
crime rates. Viewed this way, the state is simply returning the 
problem to its source and forcing counties to pay for their criminal 
justice policies. 
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The contribution this Article makes, then, is twofold. First, it 
suggests that incarceration in state prisons is one policy choice 
among many, not an inexorable reaction to violent crime. Counties 
can and do make different choices about how to respond to violent 
crime, including the extent to which they use state prisons. Second, 
this Article demonstrates why localities are crucial—and critically 
underexamined—contributors to state prison populations. Decisions 
are made at local levels about prosecution, investigation, plea 
bargaining, and sentencing, and these decisions are made by officials 
who are either elected locally (DAs, judges, and sheriffs) or 
appointed locally (police and probation officers). Local policies and 
policymakers affect the state’s corrections budget, even though the 
state has no say in designing or implementing these policies. State 
officials must take these local differences into account, and create 
incentives for counties to behave differently. 
The problem is that it is difficult to distinguish between justifiable, 
crime-driven incarceration and optional, policy-driven 
incarceration. I propose a new metric for distinguishing between 
these two types of incarceration, one which defines justified 
incarceration in terms of violent crime. This would allow the state to 
manage local usage of state prison resources without either 
penalizing crime-ridden areas or rewarding prison-happy ones. 
This Article is the first of two articles dealing with the state/county 
prison relationship. While this Article quantifies the ways in which 
the extent of local prison admissions is not necessarily a function of 
the violent crime rate, a second Article will examine whether, given 
these differences, it makes sense for the state to subsidize county 
commitments to prison. 
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INTRODUCTION 
California’s prisons are dangerously and unconstitutionally 
overcrowded.1 The state must find a way to cut its prison population 
by tens of thousands of prisoners or federal courts will force 
California to release them.2 The state has long conceded that the 
conditions in its prisons violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment,3 but it has struggled to find ways to 
sufficiently reduce overcrowding.4 Last year, the state passed AB 
109, a bill which radically reconfigured the relationship between 
local governments and the state prison system.5 AB 109, Criminal 
Justice Alignment, shifted many sentences from the state level to the 
county level.6 Local reaction to the plan has been mixed. Localities 
want to control the design and implementation of criminal justice 
policies, but they do not want to foot the bill.7 Some members of the 
California assembly opposed to AB 109 see the overcrowding 
problem as a failure of state leadership and fear that realignment will 
result in threats to public safety.8 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
 2. Id. (“[A]bsent compliance through new construction, out-of-state transfers, or other means . . . 
the State will be required to release some number of prisoners before their full sentences have been 
served.”). 
 3. Id. at 1926. 
 4. Id. at 1927–28. I note that the state reduced its prison population by 9,000 during the pendency 
of its appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at 1923. 
 5. AB 109, 2011–2012 State Legis., (Cal. 2011). Because the bill changes so many individual 
statutes, I have also cited to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest. COMM. ON BUDGET, LEGIS. COUNSEL’S 
DIGEST, AB 109 (2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-
0150/ab_109_bill_20110404_chaptered.html. 
 6. The default punishment for felonies is now 16 months or 2–3 years in county jail; before AB 
109, the default punishment was 16 months or 2–3 years in state prison. Id. The bill will also transfer 
most of the state’s parole system to the counties. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Curt Hagman, Governor’s Plan: Early Release Disguised as Realignment, SAN 
BERNARDINO CNTY. SUN, May 7, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 9126858 (Author, a California 
Assemblyman, agrees that localities can do a better job than the state but argues that it will cost his 
county (San Bernardino) money.). See also Don Thompson, Calif Law to Shift Inmates Hinges on 
Elusive Funds, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 5, 2011, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9MDHDE01.htm (citing California State Sheriff’s 
Association spokesman as saying the program is a “potential disaster” without guaranteed funding). 
 8. See, e.g., Shannon Grove, Taxpayers and Prisons, DAILY INDEP. (Ridgecrest, Cal.) (June 8, 
2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.ridgecrestca.com/opinions/columnists/x1841755204/Guest-Commentary-
Shannon-Grove-Taxpayers-and-prisons (author is a California Assemblywoman). 
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But what if the counties are actually responsible for state prison 
overcrowding, and the state is simply returning the problem to the 
counties? Local officials, not state officials, control the inflow into 
prison, through decisions about which crimes to investigate, whom to 
arrest, and whom to prosecute.9 Juries are empanelled locally, and the 
judges who preside over the proceedings are elected locally. The only 
thing statewide about the prison system is that the state administers it 
and pays for it.10 Zimring and Hawkins famously referred to this as 
“the corrections free lunch” in their 1991 book, The Scale of 
Imprisonment.11 
As the state seeks to manage its prison population, then, it must 
account for the potential policy distortions the prison subsidy creates. 
The difficulty is in distinguishing between incarceration that is, in 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Local officials arguably have this power only because state legislatures have chosen to 
criminalize so much activity that there is, practically speaking, no substantive limit to the number of 
charges attaching to each set of criminal behaviors. For the classic treatment of this problem, see 
William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. J. 505 (2001). 
 10. In this Article, I am specifically using the word “prison” to mean the state prison system. This is 
not the only carceral option available, of course. Counties have jails, where they sentence offenders, 
process arrestees, and hold those who can’t make bail until trial. 
 11. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 211 (1991). In 
California, county revenues pay for public protection, which includes judicial expenditures (including 
trial courts, clerks, the District Attorney, and the Public Defender), police and sheriffs, and detention 
and corrections (adult and youth detention, probation). Some counties receive block grants from the 
state through a number of different programs, most prominently the Local Public Safety Fund (LPSF) 
and the Local Safety and Protection Account (LPSA). The LPSF is funded through a half cent sales tax. 
CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 35. Funds are distributed based on counties’ share of total state taxable sales. 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 30052 (West 2011). The LPSA is funded through the vehicle license fund and, in 
turn, directs most of its funds to particular programs dealing with juvenile justice, law enforcement, and 
juvenile probation. CAL. STATE ASS’N OF CNTYS., LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING: SUMMARY OF 
RECENT STATUTORY CHANGES AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.csac.counties.org/images/users/1/CSAC-CSSA-CPOC%20FAQ_May%2018.pdf. Both the 
juvenile justice program and the law enforcement program make their disbursements based on county 
population; the juvenile probation program allocations are fixed by statute. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE, 
JUDICIAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 2008-09 ANALYSIS D-21–D-26 (2008–2009), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2008/crim_justice/crimjust_anl08.pdf. Thirty-seven counties also 
receive funds of equal amounts through the Small and Rural Sheriffs’ Grants. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
30070 (West 2011). 
I note that none of these disbursements is made on the basis of demonstrated financial need, nor is any 
disbursement made on the basis of a county’s level of crime. One complicating point: county revenues 
themselves come in large part from the state (32.60%) and federal (19.92%) government, meaning that 
the division between state and county (and federal government and county) is complex. CAL. STATE 
CONTROLLER, 2008-2009 COUNTIES ANNUAL REPORT iii (2011), available at 
http://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-ARD-Local/LocRep/counties_reports_0809counties.pdf. 
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some sense, justified by crime problems and that which is the result 
of local policy choices about how to deal with that crime. 
While several studies have explored the relationship between 
incarceration and crime, most have focused on the state and national 
level.12 No study has focused on the ways in which county 
governments contribute to overpopulation in the adult prison system. 
An unpublished paper by Tuosto and Peckenpaugh suggested that 
policy differences might explain the differences in county 
commitments to the California Department of Juvenile Justice.13 A 
recent study looked at sentencing models in rural and urban areas of 
Nevada.14 There have been several empirical studies examining 
county disparities in imposition of the death penalty in Illinois,15 
Missouri,16 California,17 and the federal system,18 as well as an 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Michael Tonry, in his 2004 survey of existing research, considered several possible explanations 
for why the U.S. incarcerates at such a high rate relative to other countries, concluding that the high 
crime explanation “has virtually no validity.” MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 27 (2004). 
Bruce Western comprehensively analyzed the commonly-theorized causes of incarceration, ranging 
from politics to state sentencing, but he focused primarily on the state level. BRUCE WESTERN, 
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006). Western’s compelling survey of crime and 
incarceration examines research involving cities and neighborhoods, but his analysis does not focus on 
sub-state political units as political, policy-making entities. Id. at 36. His own comparison of murder and 
incarceration rates compares states to one another. Id. at 49. His analysis of politics, state penal laws, 
and the role of discretion in sentencing are all focused on the state level. Id. at 59–66. 
 13. Nicholas Tuosto & Jason Peckenpaugh, CA County Use of DJJ: 1990–2003 (unpublished article) 
(on file with author); see also SELENA TEJI & MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
AN ANALYSIS OF DIRECT ADULT CRIMINAL COURT FILING 2003–2009: WHAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT 
OF PROPOSITION 21? (2011), available at 
http://www.cjcj.org/files/What_has_been_the_effect_of_Prop_21.pdf (noting disparities in the rates at 
which California counties filed charges against juveniles in adult court, and examining the fiscal impacts 
of the practice). 
 14. Victoria Springer et al., Felony Sentencing in Rural and Urban Courts: Comparing Formal 
Legal and Substantive Political Models in the West (Working Paper Series, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441593. 
 15. Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the Ryan Commutations: 
Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1301, 1324–41 (2010) (analyzing, inter alia, county disparities in the prosecution of capital cases and 
concluding that “the total number of murders during the period and the average annual murder rate do 
not correlate with the number of capital prosecutions in the county”). 
 16. Katherine Barnes, David Sloss & Stephen Thaman, Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of 
Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009). 
 17. ROMY GANSCHOW, ACLU OF N. CAL., DEATH BY GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY 
ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA (2008), available at 
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/death_by_geography/death_by_geography.p
df. 
 18. G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 85 
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excellent theoretical treatment of the county role in death penalty 
administration.19 In 2007, the Justice Policy Institute analyzed 
disparities in the prosecution of drug offenses among 198 counties 
nationwide.20 The California state Offender Information Services 
Branch analyzed California counties’ imposition of second and third 
strikes under its Three Strikes law, but did so only for a single year 
and only for strike-eligible offenses.21 Twenty years after Zimring 
and Hawkins wrote that the correctional free lunch required 
“empirical and theoretical work which will both complicate and 
enrich the public choice model with special reference to decisions 
about imprisonment,”22 few studies have been produced. This Article 
and the one to follow will try to fill that gap. 
California is a massive state, with more than one tenth of the 
country’s population.23 Los Angeles County alone has a population 
greater than all but ten states.24 Eight counties besides Los Angeles 
have more than a million people,25 a population larger than that of the 
smallest seven states. California’s prison population is, 
                                                                                                                 
WASH. L. REV. 425, 429 (2010) (finding that “the geography of the federal death penalty is anything but 
uniform. Six of the ninety-four federal judicial districts account for one-third of death-authorizations”). 
 19. Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role 
in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010). 
 20. PHILLIP BEATTY ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE VORTEX: THE CONCENTRATED RACIAL 
IMPACT OF DRUG IMPRISONMENT AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PUNITIVE COUNTIES 3 (2007), 
available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-12_REP_Vortex_AC-DP.pdf (finding that 
“it has become apparent that local policies shape the day-to-day identification of drug users and their 
entry into the criminal justice system”). 
 21. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKER FELONS IN THE 
ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION (2008), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Quarterly/Strike1/S
TRIKE1d0806.pdf. 
 22. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 215. 
 23. U.S. Census Bureau, State Rankings—Statistical Abstract of the United States (2010), available 
at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ranks/rank01.html) (listing California’s population as 
36,961,664 out of a national population of 307,006,550). 
 24. Id. The California Department of Finance estimated that Los Angeles County’s 2010 population 
was 9, 827, 070. CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., E-2. CALIFORNIA COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES AND 
COMPONENTS OF CHANGE BY YEAR—JULY 1, 2000–2010 (2010) [hereinafter E-2 CALIFORNIA COUNTY 
POPULATION ESTIMATES], available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/estimates/e-2/2000-10/view.php (follow 
hyperlink). 
 25. In alphabetical order: Alameda, Contra Costa, Orange, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino, 
San Diego, and Santa Clara. See E-2 CALIFORNIA COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES, supra note 24 
(showing that Montana is 44th with a population of 979,989). 
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correspondingly, nearly the same size as the federal system’s prison 
population. California is, therefore, a good place to start the analysis 
of the counties’ role in state prison overpopulation: the scale of 
California’s prisons—as well as the scale of its overcrowding—is of 
national import. 
California can be thought of not only as a single state, but also as a 
collection of fifty-eight counties. Counties are significant political 
entities in their own right, distinct from the state. Residents run their 
counties: there is no statewide politicking in local elections for 
Sheriff, District Attorney, county council, or judge. A California 
voter in one county has no say in how another county makes its 
criminal justice decisions. 
The pair of Alameda and San Bernardino Counties presents 
perhaps the starkest example of how local decisions can affect 
counties’ usage of state prison resources. A ten-year average of 
county data (2000–2009) shown on the chart below indicates that 
both counties have similarly-sized populations, similar amounts of 
reported violent crime (criminal homicide, rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault), similar amounts of reported property crime 
(burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny-theft over $400), and 
similar amounts of all reported “Part I” crime (all of the above crimes 
plus larceny-theft under $400 and arson).26 Overall crime rates are 
nearly identical: Alameda is a little more violent and San Bernardino 
is a little worse for property crime. Both counties are part of the same 
state, governed by the same penal code and state judicial system, yet 
ten-year averages of prison usage for that time show two radically 
different outcomes: San Bernardino’s prison population was more 
than twice as high, on average, as Alameda’s, and it sent an average 
of more than three times as many “new felons” to prison each year. 
                                                                                                                 
 26. The Uniform Crime Reporting Program divides crimes into Part I and Part II. Part I crimes 
include criminal homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary (breaking and entering), larceny-
theft not of a motor vehicle, motor vehicle theft, and arson. UCR Offense Definitions, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTING STATISTICS, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). These 
offenses were chosen “because they are serious crimes, they occur with regularity in all areas of the 
country, and they are likely to be reported to police.” Id. 
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Table 1: Crime Comparison Between San Bernardino and 
Alameda Counties, Average Yearly Values 2000-2009 
 San 
Bernardino
Alameda Ratio of San 
Bernardino to 
Alameda 
Total Population  1,923,360 1,506,740 1.28 
Reported Violent 
Crime 
9,956.6 10,629 .94 
Reported 
Property Crime 
38,762 36,072 1.07 
All Reported 
Part I Crime 
72,454 74,194 .98 
Yearly Prison 
Population 
11,441 4,555 2.51 
Yearly New 
Felon 
Admissions 
3,792 1,088 3.49 
All figures are ten-year averages, 2000-2009.27 
 
The results of this comparison on a year-to-year basis are shown 
graphically in Figure 1. The yearly data was calculated as a ratio (San 
Bernardino to Alameda). As in the chart above, a ratio of one means 
the counties have equal numbers for that particular category, a ratio 
above one indicates the degree to which San Bernardino’s numbers 
exceed Alameda’s, and a ratio below one indicates the degree to 
which San Bernardino’s numbers are lower than Alameda’s. The 
                                                                                                                 
 27. The data for this chart, and all charts and tables in this Article, has been posted online at 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162. The hyperlink marked “READ ME FIRST.doc” 
contains a guide to every chart, table, and graph in this Article. The data from this table in particular 
comes from W. DAVID BALL, TOUGH CHART DATA MARCH 2012 REVISED (2012) [hereinafter TOUGH 
CHART DATA], available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 (follow Tough Chart Data 
March 2012 Revised.xls hyperlink) (tab “All Data 10y avg as #s”); the ratio was calculated in W. DAVID 
BALL, COUNTY COMPARISONS (2012) [hereinafter COUNTY COMPARISONS], available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 (follow County Comparisons.xls hyperlink) (tab “SB 
Alameda Pct”). 
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chart clearly demonstrates that the year-to-year story is no different 
than the one told by the ten-year average. During all ten years, San 
Bernardino had at least twice the prison population and more than 
twice the number of new felon admissions—sometimes many 
more—and it did so without suffering from any more crime than 
Alameda. 
 
These two counties, then, are almost identical in material ways 
when it comes to crime, but they are incredibly different when it 
comes to usage of state prison resources. For new felon admissions 
alone, San Bernardino costs the state, on average, $93,045,566 more 
each year than Alameda; its total prison population costs the state, on 
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Figure 1: San Bernardino and Alameda Crime Rates and Prison Usage
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average, an extra $236,761,677 each year.28 Referencing reported 
crime rates cannot explain this difference. The state is paying for San 
Bernardino’s decision to treat crime with prison, but Alameda—
indeed, any California citizen who does not live in San Bernardino—
has no say in electing the people who design San Bernardino’s 
criminal justice policies. Why should the state pay for a decision only 
some of its citizens make, when residents of other counties make 
different decisions? In other words, is realignment a sign that the 
correctional free lunch is over? 
The most persuasive justification for the use of prison is that it is a 
response to crime; this paper primarily addresses that argument. For 
purposes of this analysis it is assumed that crime rates are exogenous: 
that is, counties do not (or cannot) breed crime through policy. This 
Article takes no position on whether this is necessarily the case; it is 
assumed merely to limit the scope of this Article, and to take the 
“prison as a necessary response to crime” argument at its strongest.29 
This Article makes no claim that prison should not be used to treat 
crime. The focus of the study is to show that violent crime rates alone 
cannot explain the observed difference in prison usage among 
counties. This Article specifically focuses on violent crimes because 
all the dominant justifications for imprisonment—incapacitation, 
retribution, and deterrence—consider violent crimes to be the most 
worthy of incapacitation, the most deserving of punishment, and the 
most serious offenses to be deterred.30 
This analysis starts with the proposition that the average of a state 
as large as California—with a single county larger than all but nine 
states31—smooths over very real differences, much like taking the per 
capita average income in a room with Bill Gates would also be 
misleading. While the study examines data at the statewide level, the 
bulk of the analysis is focused at the county level. This analysis 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27. 
 29. For the argument that prison is criminogenic, see, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: 
Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 240–41 (2009). 
 30. This Article does not address drug crimes, except briefly in Part III.B., infra, for one main 
reason: there are no reported drug crimes and no reported drug crime statistics. The simple fact is that 
people who buy, sell, grow, make, possess, and use drugs typically do not report these activities to law 
enforcement, and thus they are not reflected in reported crime statistics. 
 31. Supra note 24. 
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shows that San Bernardino and Alameda are not anomalous: the state 
as a whole is divided between counties which persistently use prison 
resources at high rates and those which use prison at low rates. The 
counties with the highest rate of prison usage, have, as a whole, 
below-average violent crime rates. They also have lower property 
and “Part I” crime rates. The argument that prison usage is driven by 
violent crime rates has no statistical support. 
A.  The Coverage Model 
This Article makes one normative proposal: that violent crime 
rates should be driving the state’s willingness to pay for localities’ 
prison commitments. This Article divides the state’s counties into 
four segments based on the relationship, within each county, of 
reported violent crime and the number of new felons it sends to 
prison. A new variable is defined to measure this relationship: the 
violent crime coverage rate (“coverage”).32 Coverage is the amount 
of new felon admissions (NFA)33 for a given county in a given year 
as a percentage of reported violent crime34 for that county in the same 
year. Mathematically, 
Coveragecountyyear = NFAcountyyear /(Violent Crimecountyyear). 
A county with 100 reported violent crimes and 50 NFA would 
have a coverage rate of 50%. A county with 500 reported violent 
crimes and 50 NFA would have a coverage rate of 10%. Higher 
numbers indicate more carceral responses: for a given level of violent 
crime, a county with higher coverage sends a larger number of new 
                                                                                                                 
 32. This measurement has sometimes been called the “effective incarceration rate,” but because this 
variable raises key questions about what is (or is not) an effective use of prison, I will use the term 
coverage instead. 
 33. NFA measures prison admissions of individuals convicted of a new crime, as opposed to those 
returning to prison on either a “technical” parole violation (e.g. failed drug test) or a new crime charged 
as a parole violation. (That is, a crime that could have been charged by a DA—and thus reflected in 
NFA statistics—might instead be processed as a parole violation, returning the parolee to prison.) NFA 
describes new terms for new offenses; they do, of course, include recidivist prisoners who have been 
previously incarcerated. 
 34. Reported violent crimes include homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. 
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offenders to prison. Counties with lower numbers “cover” their 
violent crimes with fewer NFA.35 Some variance might be explained 
by the types of violent crime—more murders, for example. This 
Article will explore whether this is the case.36 
The coverage variable is used to evaluate the number of NFAs a 
county sends to state prison. Coverage is used to distinguish between 
the crime justified (or necessary) NFA and the non-justified (or 
surplus) NFA. In the above example, both counties have identical 
numbers of NFA, but the crime underlying those NFA numbers is 
five times greater in one county. Merely comparing NFA numbers 
would leave out a critical dimension of the analysis. This Article uses 
the statewide coverage rate as a baseline. Necessary incarceration is 
defined as violent crime in a county times the statewide coverage 
rate. That is, the state average is the “fair” amount of incarceration 
justified by a particular amount of violent crime; anything above the 
state average constitutes a local policy choice that is being subsidized 
with state funds. This is obviously a normative choice, but it aligns 
with the thrust of this Article’s argument: the rest of the state should 
not subsidize a county’s deviation from state policies. If a county 
makes different choices from the state as a whole, it should bear the 
cost of those policies (and reap the benefits). It is also consonant with 
California’s realignment plan, which reserves state prison sentences 
for violent offenders, serious offenders, or sex offenders.37 
The statewide coverage rate, then, is a proxy for the amount of 
incarceration dictated by violent crime itself, not a county’s unique 
                                                                                                                 
 35. A number of factors might explain coverage rates: higher clearance rates (more efficient law 
enforcement), more aggressive policing strategies (e.g. broken windows), or something to do with the 
seriousness of the particular offenses (e.g., those facts deserving of more serious punishment). See infra 
Part III. 
 36. My preliminary conclusion is that rates of each type of violent crime are lower in counties which 
use a lot of prison resources and, moreover, that the more serious crimes—such as homicide—have too 
few cases to account for much of a difference. See infra Part I.B. I also examine the offender mix of 
county NFA. See infra Part III.A. 
 37. See AB 109, 2011–2012 State Legis., (Cal. 2011), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_bill_20110404_chaptered.html 
(“The bill provides exceptions to imprisonment in county jail for a variety of felonies, including serious 
felonies and violent felonies, as defined, felonies requiring registration as a sex offender, and when the 
defendant has a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony, or a felony subjecting the defendant to 
registration as a sex offender, among other exceptions.”) 
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response to violent crime. Calculating the number of surplus NFA in 
this way more closely ties prison usage to the justification for that 
usage, and differentiates between counties which have to use a lot of 
prison and those which choose to use a lot of prison. 
The surplus NFA numbers were calculated as follows. The state’s 
coverage rate for a given year was multiplied by the number of 
reported violent crimes in each county that year to determine the 
“crime justified” NFA. These “crime justified” NFA numbers were 
subtracted from a county’s actual NFA numbers to arrive at that 
county’s NFA surplus (or deficit). As an example, consider a county 
with 100 reported violent crimes and 25 NFA during a year when the 
state coverage rate was ten percent. The justified NFA figure for the 
county would be 10 (100 x .1) and the surplus NFA figure would be 
15 (25 minus 10). To calculate the dollar amount of the subsidy, this 
surplus (or deficit) NFA figure was multiplied by that year’s per 
capita prisoner cost. Mathematically, 
Subsidycountyyear = (GrossNFAcountyyear – (Coveragestateyear * Violent 
Crimecountyyear)) * Per Capita Prison Coststateyear 
I again emphasize that subsidy dollar amounts are not a measure of 
the total cost of prison.38 This estimate only calculates the cost for the 
first year of imprisonment for surplus NFA. Sentence lengths are 
undoubtedly an immense factor in determining the total cost of a 
county’s use of state prisons. That is, a county with a below-coverage 
NFA number might nevertheless have higher costs because their 
felons stay in prison longer. (Of course, it could also be that counties 
with higher NFA rates also give longer sentences, in which case the 
subsidy numbers will be underweighted relative to the ultimate fiscal 
cost.) Nevertheless, I believe that the cost of NFA provides us with a 
useful entry point to see which counties benefit from prison subsidies 
                                                                                                                 
 38. We can easily get that number by multiplying the total numbers of prisoners from a given county 
by that year’s cost per prisoner. That number, however, treats all prison commitments as desirable, or at 
least undifferentiated. Using coverage to calculate subsidies, however, accounts for the best reason for 
incarceration—violent crime. Incarceration at the statewide coverage rate is justified; anything else is 
surplus. 
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and which counties are taxed by them. I discuss the implications of 
sentence lengths infra at Part IVB. 
This Article focuses on NFA, not total prison population, for 
simplicity. Stephen Raphael and Michael Stoll have modeled prison 
population as a function of admission rates, release rates, and the 
prison population the year before.39 This Article focuses on 
admissions rates alone because it seeks to differentiate between 
crime-justified incarceration and policy-driven incarceration. 
Sentence length, which affects time to release, invariably involves 
case-specific factors which do not lend themselves to systematic 
analysis. It is difficult enough to determine what constitutes a “real 
offense;” it is that much more difficult to determine the “real” 
sentence length of a given offense, as the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission has so often demonstrated. 
NFA, instead, simply measures who enters prison from a given 
county, not how long they stay there. Its simplicity is not without its 
costs, however. It is, of course, possible that Low Use counties are 
sending offenders to prison for longer sentences than High Use 
counties, and therefore their prison usage is greater over the long 
term. If that is the case, the method chosen in this Article will not 
account for that. I revisit this question with additional data infra at 
Part IIA and Part IVB, where I look at the actual percentages of 
offense types in each county’s NFA and how long they are sentenced, 
respectively, and conclude that this is not the case. I also note that 
total prison population for Low Use counties is consistently much 
lower than that of High Use counties, suggesting that the “time to 
release” variable noted by Stoll and Raphael is not operative, at least 
in the ten years of data examined in this Article. 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Stephen Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison?, in DO PRISONS 
MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 6 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. 
Stoll eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/why_are_so_many_americans_in_prison.pdf. Raphael and Stoll 
conclude that the increase in population is not primarily due to increases in crime, characterizing the rise 
in incarceration as a policy experiment. Id. at 65. 
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B.   Why Coverage Matters 
If the violent crime to NFA relationship is not predictive at the 
state level, this raises two obvious questions: what might explain it, 
and why does this even matter? As to the first question, this Article 
considers a variety of explanations: other crimes, local law 
enforcement, politics, per capita income, and the use and type of in-
county dispositions. The exploration of these subjects is, for space 
reasons, tentative, but the dataset is posted online and others are 
encouraged to do additional analysis.40 
There are three ways in which this analysis makes potentially 
significant contributions. First, there are very real fiscal impacts to 
counties’ usage of prison, ones that are not transparent enough in the 
present system. By controlling for the influence of violent crime, the 
estimation of fiscal impact is a closer representation of differences in 
policy among counties, policy choices which are subsidized by the 
unwilling residents of other counties. This Article is part of a two-
part series that examines why states should subsidize state prisons 
when local officials decide who is sent there.41 This Article will, it is 
hoped, dispel the idea that the level of prison usage in California is a 
necessary result of violent crime. 
Using the coverage rate model of prison subsidy, this Article will 
demonstrate that some individual counties that make different policy 
choices—choices not dictated by the average response to violent 
crime—cost the state tens of millions of dollars a year, every year, 
while others leave tens of millions of dollars of prison resources on 
the table. This Article also explores what would happen if the entire 
state incarcerated at the coverage rate of the most carceral counties. 
This raises a key question: if one county or set of counties is entitled 
to incarcerate at a given rate, why shouldn’t other counties do so as 
well? And if the state can only afford to have some counties 
incarcerating greater numbers of people per violent crime, which 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27. (The hyperlink marked “READ ME FIRST.doc” 
contains a guide to every chart, table, and graph in this Article.). 
 41. See also W. David Ball, Why Should States Pay For Prisons, When Local Officials Decide Who 
Goes There? (Working Paper Series, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871274. 
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ones get to do so, and on what basis? Ultimately, this analysis sheds 
light on how—or whether—residents of under-incarcerating counties 
can rein in over-incarcerating counties in the present system, given 
that all citizens pay for prison equally through general state revenues, 
regardless of how heavily their counties use prison. 
The second point is that state prison problems are not necessarily 
best addressed by statewide solutions. As this Article demonstrates, 
counties operating under the same set of laws and in the same court 
system get widely different results. Statewide solutions—such as 
changes to statutes, sentencing commissions, and the like—are 
almost always proposed as the means of addressing state prison 
overpopulation. But, because they fail to address the differences in 
local enforcement, they cannot effectively address the problem. In 
other words, because they are based on an inaccurate or incomplete 
diagnosis of the cause of state prison usage, these solutions cannot 
cure the disease.42 
Third, this analysis has important ramifications for the state’s 
implementation of criminal justice realignment. The question of how 
much incarceration counties will be expected to deal with inside the 
county depends crucially on how California sets the baseline rate of 
each county’s use of state resources. The current plan is to set the 
baseline at current levels of prison usage. This would be a mistake, in 
my view, because it would make permanent the state subsidies of 
what appear to be policy choices. Just because a county has been 
using state prisons at a given rate does not mean that it had to. I 
propose, instead, that the state base prison usage on reported violent 
crime rates and the statewide violent-crime-to-new-felon-admission 
coverage rate. This would tie funding to need, rather than funding to 
use. 
*** 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Franklin Zimring, in a recent article, observes that the huge growth in prison population during 
the 1970s and 1980s was not accompanied by any significant changes in state penal codes. Because of 
the discretion in the American system, however, “substantial changes in aggregate punishment policy 
can take place without any substantial change in the legislation governing the levels of punishment 
available or the choice of punishments in individual cases.” Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of 
Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth Century Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1225, 1232 (2010). 
17
Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1004 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the sources and 
methods used for this Article. Part II examines the relationship 
between crime and incarceration. Part III explores other possible 
explanations for differences in county commitments to state prisons. 
Part IV lays out the fiscal implications of differences in incarceration 
rates, demonstrating that counties which incarcerate at a relatively 
greater rate are doing so at great cost to the state: that is, they are 
tough on crime on the state’s dime. This Article concludes with a 
discussion of potential policy implications this analysis has for the 
future of California criminal justice reform. 
I. SOURCES, LIMITATIONS, AND METHODS OF THE STUDY 
This Section provides a brief outline of how this study was 
conducted. I begin by describing the data sources used in this Article, 
all of which are made available online by the state. I then discuss 
some limitations with this study that might explain the results. I then 
discuss further the ways in which I subdivided the state on the basis 
of violent crime coverage rates and the calculated prison subsidy. 
A.   Sources 
The state of California maintains several public databases available 
on the internet; it also publishes annual reports on the offender 
population incarcerated in the state’s prison. The data I used in this 
analysis came from these sources and dates from 2000 to 2009. All 
data has been compiled into a single spreadsheet which I have made 
available online.43 In this section, I will discuss sources for particular 
data, as well as changes to the data I made, where necessary to 
account for things such as the difference between calendar year and 
fiscal year reporting. 
County population. The California Department of Justice uses 
estimates from the State Department of Finance to generate three 
potentially useful county population figures, divided by age: Total 
                                                                                                                 
 43.  See generally http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162. 
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Population at Risk, (ages 10-69), Adult Population at Risk (ages 18-
69), and Juvenile Population at Risk (ages 10-17).44 I have used the 
Adult Population at Risk (APAR) figures throughout this Article and 
have calculated crime, arrest, and new felon admission rates using 
raw numbers and dividing by these population figures, normalizing 
per 100,000.45 I did so to avoid rate differences that might stem from 
using different population figures. The California Department of 
Finance estimates the total adult population for each county as of 
July 1 of each year.46 I have used total population figures to contrast 
with Adult Population at Risk only where noted. These figures do not 
include relevant information about population distribution—e.g., 
degree of urbanization—that might be relevant drivers of crime 
and/or carceral responses, nor do they include figures about racial or 
ethnic subpopulations within a given county, which might also be 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 
2000: BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2000), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof00/00/27.pdf. The 
term “at Risk” presumably refers to those people who are at greatest risk of becoming involved with the 
criminal justice system, either as juveniles or adults, but the figure counts all residents of a county in 
that age group. 
 45. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS BY CITY AND 
COUNTY: CSJC TABLES (2000), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/datatabs.php. Individual population 
reports are also available. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POPULATION 
ESTIMATES, 2009 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2009), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2008 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2008), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof08/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2007 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2007), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof07/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2006 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2006), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof06/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2005 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2005), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof05/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2004 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2004), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof04/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2003 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2003), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof03/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2002 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2002), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof02/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2001 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2001), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof01/00/27.pdf; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, POPULATION ESTIMATES, 2000 BY COUNTY tbl.27 (2000), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof00/00/27.pdf. 
 46. See E-2 CALIFORNIA COUNTY POPULATION ESTIMATES, supra note 24. 
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relevant. Department of Finance figures do, however, account for 
both legal residents and “unauthorized foreign immigrants.”47 
Prison Population by County, New Felon Admissions by 
County, and Parole Violators with a New Term by County. The 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation publishes 
annual population reports on prisoners housed in state prisons. Each 
year, the state publishes the total population of prisoners by county of 
commitment as of December 31 of that year,48 as well as yearly totals 
by county for new felon admissions and parole revocations.49 I note 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. 
 48. California Prisoners & Parolees Report Archive, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPrisArch
ive.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (follow hyperlinks for individuals years between 2000 and 2009). 
2002 and 2001 reports contained data from the year prior; reports after 2004 contained data from that 
year. In 2003, the Data Analysis Unit combined two years’ worth of data into one report. DATA 
ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & PAROLEES 2009 tbl.10 
(2009), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2009.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & 
PAROLEES 2008 tbl.10 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2008.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & 
PAROLEES 2007 tbl.10 (2007), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2007.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & 
PAROLEES 2006 tbl.10 (2006), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2006.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & 
PAROLEES 2005 tbl.10 (2005), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2005.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & 
PAROLEES 2004 tbl.10 (2004), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2004.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & 
PAROLEES 2003 34 tbl.10, 139 tbl.10 (2003), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2003.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & 
PAROLEES 2002 tbl.10 (2002), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2002.pdf; DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & 
PAROLEES 2001 tbl.10 (2001), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPris/CA
LPRISd2001.pdf. 
 49. See California Prisoners & Parolees Report Archive, supra note 48, at tbl.5A (for the years 2000 
and 2002–06); Id. at tbl.15A (for the years 2007–09). 2000 data is in the 2001 report. 2002 data is in the 
2002 report. The 2003 report provides 2003 data in the second set of tables. Id. at 128 tbl.5A. Thereafter 
the data for a given year is in that year’s report. 2001 data was not given in any of the annual reports. It 
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that this population figure is taken in a different month (December) 
than the county population figures noted above (July) and that prison 
figures represent actual headcounts, while county population figures 
are estimated. 
Crime and Arrest Figures; Probation and Jail Figures. I used 
Department of Justice published data for reported crimes,50 felony 
arrests,51 adult probation caseload,52 and jail population figures.53 As 
noted earlier, I chose to calculate rates per 100,000 APAR myself, 
                                                                                                                 
was, instead, taken from Characteristics Of Felon New Admissions And Parole Violators Returned With 
A New Term: Calendar Year 2001. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, DEP’T OF CORR., CHARACTERISTICS OF 
FELON NEW ADMISSIONS AND PAROLE VIOLATORS RETURNED WITH A NEW TERM: CALENDAR YEAR 
2001 tbl.11, tbl.16 (2002), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/ACHAR1/A
CHAR1d2001.pdf. The figures from Tables 11 and 16 were added to arrive at total new admissions 
figures (calculated). 
 50. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s county crimes data, see Statistics: 
Crimes, 1999–2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/CrimeCo.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county data 
may be accessed by following hyperlinks to each county). 
 51. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s county arrests data, see Statistics: 
Felony Arrests, 1999–2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/ArrestCoFel.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county 
data may be accessed by following hyperlinks to each county). 
 52. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s adult probation data, see Statistics: 
Supervision, 1999–2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/SuperCo.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county data 
may be accessed by following hyperlinks to each county). The data is incomplete: Contra Costa, 
Merced, Sacramento, Siskiyou, Tulare, and Yolo counties did not report separate misdemeanor 
population counts. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
TREND DATA FOOTNOTES (2009), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/footnotes.pdf. 
Mariposa County reported -47 people on the misdemeanor probation caseload for 2000, so I deleted all 
data from that year; the same is true for San Joaquin County for 2002, which reported a felony probation 
caseload of -423. See Statistics: Supervision, 1999–2009, supra (follow hyperlinks for Mariposa County 
and San Joaquin County). Gaps in the data also crop up intermittently and are a result of no data being 
reported; they should not be read as zeroes. 
 53. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s jail population data, see 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/index.htm (2009), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof08/index.htm (2008), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof07/index.htm (2007), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof06/index.htm (2006), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof05/index.htm (2005), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof04/index.htm (2004), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof03/index.htm (2003), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof02/index.htm (2002), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof01/index.htm (2001), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof00/index.htm (2000) (individual county data may be accessed by 
following hyperlinks; select county name and table 8, jail profile survey). Total figures might not add up 
due to projections and rounding of numbers. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., supra note 52. 
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rather than rely on the state’s rates, to avoid differentials based solely 
on different numbers (or definitions) of population. I use crime and 
arrest figures for two reasons. First, arrest figures can serve as a 
proxy for how active and/or effective law enforcement in a particular 
locale is (through the use of community policing, etc.). I examined 
county clearance rates as well to determine how effective a given 
county was at solving crimes.54 Second, because there are no reported 
drug crime statistics, drug arrests serve as a proxy for drug crimes, 
albeit an imperfect one, since they conflate policing resources, 
strategies, and priorities with the level of underlying activity. 
This data is subject to a number of limitations.55 If multiple crimes 
take place, only the most serious is recorded.56 The same is true when 
an offender is arrested for multiple offenses.57 Crime is generally 
seen to be subject to reporting variations: a particular county might 
have actual crime rates that are a greater or lesser percentage of 
reported crimes. The state collects information on dispositions; 
however, this data is marred by a very large “other” category and the 
state cautions that dispositions “data may or may not be 
representative at the county level.”58 Accordingly, I have focused 
only on county jail and probation figures. Within the jail data, I have 
ignored data on Type I facilities, which are used only for detentions 
of up to 96 hours, not sentencing; I have, instead, used figures for 
Type II, III, and IV facilities59 because they can be used to sentence 
                                                                                                                 
 54. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s county clearance data, see 
Statistics: Crimes, 2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/ClearanceCo.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county 
data may be accessed by following hyperlinks to each county). I calculated clearance rates using the 
number of cleared cases. 
 55. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
AND KNOWN LIMITATIONS (2009), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/limits.pdf. See 
also CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TREND DATA 
FOOTNOTES (2009), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/footnotes.pdf. 
 56. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., supra note 55, at 1. 
 57. Id. at 2. 
 58. Id. at 2–3. 
 59. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 1006 (2012). “Type II facility” means a local detention facility used 
for the detention of persons pending arraignment, during trial, and upon a sentence of commitment. Id. 
“Type III facility” means a local detention facility used only for the detention of convicted and 
sentenced persons. Id. “Type IV facility” means a local detention facility or portion thereof designated 
for the housing of inmates eligible under Penal Code Section 1208 for work/education furlough and/or 
22
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4
2012] TOUGH ON CRIME 1009 
offenders. These figures are taken from actual population reports and 
are divided between sentenced and non-sentenced prisoners. Non-
sentenced prisoners are those who are denied bail, unable to make 
bail, or in some form of temporary detention. 
Cost per Prisoner. I calculated the cost per prisoner by using 
corrections budget figures60 and dividing by the prison population. 
This is a crude approximation of the cost per prisoner since there are 
certain fixed costs in the state prison system that are not fully realized 
on a marginal basis and because some of the funds go to the 
Department of Juvenile Justice. However, this is the same method the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics has used in its State Prison Expenditures 
series.61 Again, because the state’s fiscal year goes from July 1 to 
June 30, I averaged two years together in order to get approximations 
                                                                                                                 
other programs involving inmate access into the community. Id. 
 60. See California Budget Historical Documents, 2012–13, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (for Final Budget Summaries, select 
year from drop down menu). For budget figures for 2000–2001, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2000–01 FINAL 
BUDGET SUMMARY 48 (2001), available at http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/ 
GovernorsBudget/pdf/2000-01budsum.pdf. For budget figures for 2001–2002, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 
2001–02 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY (2002), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/2001-02budsum.pdf. For budget figures 
for 2002–2003, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2002–03 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 384 (2003), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/ 
GovernorsBudget/pdf/2002-03budsum.pdf. For budget figures for 2003–2004, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 
2003–04 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/2003-04budsum.pdf. For budget figures 
for 2004–2005, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2004–05 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 6 (2005), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/ 
GovernorsBudget04/pdf/fbudsum_04.pdf. For budget figures for 2005–2006, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 
2005–06 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 11 (2006), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget05/pdf/fbudsum_05.pdf. For budget reports for 
2006–2007, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2006–07 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 400 (2007), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/ 
GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_06.pdf. For budget figures for 2007–2008, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 
2007–08 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 14 (2008), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_07.pdf. For budget figures for 
2008–2009, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2008–09 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 18 (2009), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/ 
GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_0809.pdf. For budget figures for 2009–2010, see CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 
2009–10 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_09.pdf. 
 61. See, e.g., JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE 
PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf. 
23
Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1010 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
of calendar year figures—with the exception of 2000, for which I 
simply used 2000–2001 figures. 
My calculations are actually lower than the estimates published by 
the state Legislative Analyst’s Office (L.A.O), which estimated that 
the cost of incarcerating each prisoner in California in 2008–2009 
was $47,102.62 My estimate for the calendar year 2008 was 
$41,200.05. Because the L.A.O has not released estimates for all the 
years in my survey, however, I decided to use calculated figures. If 
anything, this indicates that the subsidy the state pays to counties that 
are heavy users of the state prison system—and the corresponding tax 
on those counties that do not use it as heavily—might be greater than 
the figures used in this Article. 
B.   Limitations of the Study 
The main difficulty with this study is deciding what proxy to use 
for the “fair” rate of prison usage to which a county is rightfully 
entitled. I make no normative claim about how a county should use 
prisons, nor have I found a statistical one.63 There is no consensus on 
this in California, academia, or elsewhere. In fact, that is the point of 
this series of articles: given this lack of consensus, residents of a 
particular county should not have to pay for the policy choices of 
residents of another county. High coverage rates are not necessarily 
bad, nor are low ones good. My point is only that if there is no 
consensus, high rates should not be subsidized, nor low rates 
penalized. In other words, while I make no claims about high usage 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See California’s Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYSTS’ 
OFFICE, http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections 
/crim_justice/6_cj_inmatecost.aspx?catid=3 (last visited Jan. 16, 2012); see also CAL. STATE AUDITOR, 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION: IT FAILS TO TRACK AND USE DATA 
THAT WOULD ALLOW IT TO MORE EFFECTIVELY MONITOR AND MANAGE ITS OPERATIONS 26 (2009), 
available at http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2009-107.1.pdf (estimating an annual cost per inmate in 
2007–2008 of $49,300). 
 63. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, I believe that normative questions cannot be avoided even in 
a heavily quantified context. See W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 395, 397 (2011) (questioning whether parole release is “inherently about risk or inherently 
about desert, or whether it is irreducibly about both”). 
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itself, I do claim that the state’s prison resources should not be 
distributed on a first-come, first-served basis.64 
While using violent crime rates is a crude measure of the need for 
prison, I do not believe there is a “real offense” alternative. That is, 
there is no way to readily look at a given criminal case or set of 
criminal cases and determine which ones should result in a prison 
sentence and which ones should not. There are a number of 
complicating factors. The first is plea bargaining. Charged offenses 
are an inaccurate measure of the real offense because a DA might 
overcharge for strategic reasons in order to posture during plea or 
charge bargaining. Offenses might also be undercharged as the result 
of such bargaining. The second complicating factor is evidentiary. 
The strength of an individual case has as much to do with evidentiary 
concerns as with the heinousness of the underlying conduct. A case 
with bad facts might nevertheless get a lower sentence due to a lack 
of witnesses or a lack of high-quality witnesses (for example, if the 
available witnesses can be impeached due to prior criminal offenses). 
Evidence might be excluded due to violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, or confessions might be invalidated due to violations of 
the Fifth Amendment. A third issue has to do with what the 
defendant might be able to offer in a different case. Individuals with 
valuable testimony to offer can exchange that testimony for reduced 
sentences even if they’re caught red-handed. This, again, has nothing 
to do with the real offense conduct at issue. Finally, isolating 
aggravating sentencing factors, such as prior offenses, use of a 
particular weapon, proximity to schools (in the case of drug dealing), 
etc., would be far too complex. I considered using “wobblers”—
California crimes that can be charged as felonies or misdemeanors—
                                                                                                                 
 64. This might be different were citizens of a state to agree that prison beds should, for example, be 
allocated on the basis of risk, but these risk assessments would have to be administered routinely (and 
accurately) throughout the criminal justice system. For one argument exploring the fiscal implications of 
risk-based allocation of sentencing outcomes, see Michael Connelly, Evidence-Based, Public Safety 
Sentences and Fiscal Crisis: Maintaining Public Safety in the Face of Permanent Entrenchment (Jan. 19, 
2010) (unpublished article) (on file with author). This Article analyzes survival rates (defined as no 
return to Oklahoma prison) of offenders with low, moderate, and high risk profiles sentenced to prison 
only, prison and probation, suspended probation, and deferred probation, and finds that prison is most 
effective for high risk prisoners and contraindicated for low and moderate risk offenders. Id. at 16–17. 
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but could not control for the above variables. If there were a way to 
determine whether an offense should have been charged as a felony 
or misdemeanor, one could obviously see how it was charged and 
determine overuse or underuse of prison accordingly. But asking how 
a wobbler should have been charged is, in fact, the question we 
cannot answer. The point of this study is not to question the decisions 
of individual DAs, judges, or juries in individual cases but to start to 
explore the systematic differences that might explain why California 
counties use prison at different rates. 
I used counties to examine intra-state differences primarily 
because there are several county-wide elected officials instrumental 
in criminal justice: county citizens elect sheriffs, DAs, and judges; 
counties administer probation; cities within counties elect the mayors 
who appoint police chiefs; and juries are drawn from within counties. 
Perhaps a better way of putting it is that California citizens have no 
say in selecting another county’s sheriffs, judges, DAs, or juries. 
Counties are thus responsible for the overwhelming proportion of law 
enforcement within their borders, the charges that are filed, the trials 
that take place, and the jails or probation departments to which 
offenders might be sent. California also publishes its crime data by 
county. 
Nevertheless, I concede that parts of counties can be different from 
one another and might have more in common with parts of 
neighboring counties than they do with parts of their own counties.65 
Counties can be a mix of rural and urban, for example, and this might 
bear on the way crime manifests itself. Cities within counties also 
drive their own policies, primarily through municipal police 
departments. Some counties might have transient populations or be 
victimized by criminals who reside in neighboring counties. Even 
within a given county agency, different parts of the county might 
have different approaches. Different offices of a county DA might 
                                                                                                                 
 65. For a fuller discussion, see W. David Ball, E Pluribus Unum: Data and Operations Integration 
in the California Criminal Justice System, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 277, 294 (2010) (discussing 
shortcomings with using the county as the base unit for criminal justice). 
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have different sentencing or charging “going rates” for a given crime, 
for example, particularly in a county as large as Los Angeles. 
I look at rates, not numbers, for a variety of reasons. The primary 
reason is the high degree of collinearity between population size and 
gross amounts of violent crime and new felon admissions.66 That is, 
bigger counties have more crime and more NFAs as a result of 
having more people. Population size has nothing to do with NFA 
rate, however, and is not a reliable predictor of NFA rates normalized 
to 100,000 residents. 
Comparing rates within a given year has the additional advantage 
of isolating for year-to-year statutory and regulatory changes. 
Statutes—albeit not their execution—are uniform across the state for 
every given year, but they change from year to year. This study looks 
laterally from county to county in a given year, not within a county 
across time. Year-to-year NFA rates, for example, would have to 
account for changes in the penal code during the period studied. 
Proposition 36, for example, was passed in 2000 and went into effect 
in 2001, and it allowed for first- and second-time nonviolent drug 
offenders to be diverted into treatment in lieu of incarceration.67 This 
likely had some year-to-year effect on drug NFA. 
I note that my conclusions are only as good as the reported data. I 
take no position on how accurate the data is, and I note that the state 
has expressed skepticism about particular counties’ data in particular 
years.68 I am unaware, however, of any systematic bias in the data. I 
note further that for data defects to affect the study in predictable 
ways (e.g. overestimating high use counties’ use of the state prison 
system), the bias would have to operate for a particular county in a 
particular direction on a multi-year basis in order to skew the results. 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Running a linear regression with gross (non-normalized) amounts of NFA as the dependent 
variable and gross (non-normalized) amounts of county population, violent crime, and property crime as 
the independent variables, the tolerance levels are between .035 and .105, meaning that 89.5% or more 
of the variance of each predictor can be explained by the other predictors. The variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) for each are also high, ranging from 9.521 to 28.338. VIFs above 2 are considered problematic. 
 67. Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, Prop 36 (codified at Cal. Health & Safety 
Code § 11999.4–.14 (West 2011); Cal. Penal Code §§ 1210, 3063.1 (West 2012)), available at 
http://www.prop36.org/. 
 68. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., supra note 55; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS CTR., supra note 52. 
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That is, Alameda would have to over-report crime for ten years and 
San Bernardino under-report it for the same duration, for example, in 
order to skew my results systematically against high use counties. 
Finally, there are the obvious limitations of statistical analysis 
itself (and of my abilities). There is more than one way to analyze 
data and several tools to do so. My goal in this Article is to dispel the 
idea that NFA are the necessary result of crime rates. While I believe 
that the data provides potential insights, lack of a statistically 
significant correlation does not mean that there is in fact no 
correlation given chance variability. The analysis may also be altered 
by omitted variables. 
C.   Methods 
This part explains the methods I used to subdivide California into 
four groups on the basis of violent crime coverage and the calculated 
numbers of surplus NFA: High Use counties, Low Use counties, Los 
Angeles County, and Middle Use counties. The terms “High Use,” 
“Low Use,” and “Middle Use” are relative, given that there is no 
consensus on the “fair” level of incarceration. For my purposes, 
“High Use” means a county that appeared in the top quartile more 
than seven times in ten years in either coverage rate or surplus 
(unjustified) NFA; “Low Use” means a county that appeared the 
same number of times in the bottom quartile of these measurements. 
As stated earlier, coverage is the ratio of NFA to reported violent 
crime, expressed as a percentage. For the purposes of county 
classification, I calculated the yearly state average coverage rate for 
each of the ten years of the study (2000–2009). I then calculated 
yearly coverage rates for each of California’s fifty-eight counties. I 
expressed the county coverage rate as a percentage of that year’s state 
coverage rate, which gave me a relative measure of how much a 
given county’s coverage exceeded or undercut the state rate during 
that year. Mathematically, the formula was: 
Relative Coverageyear = County Coverageyear /(State Coverageyear) 
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This method had the benefit of controlling for year-to-year 
statewide differences in crime rate, pinpointing which counties were 
relatively more carceral, not which years were. I divided the results 
into quartiles. The top quartile contained county coverage rates that 
were almost twice as high as that year’s state coverage rate 
(199.75%). That is, in those years, these counties sent almost twice as 
many people to prison per reported violent crime as the state as a 
whole. Two counties appeared in the top quartile all ten years: Kings 
and Sutter. Eight more appeared at least seven times: Glenn and 
Trinity (both appeared eight of ten years) and Butte, Colusa, Inyo, 
Lake, Lassen, and Shasta Counties (appearing seven years). In the 
bottom quartile, six counties had coverage rates less than or equal to 
88.29% of the state coverage rate in all ten years: Alameda, Contra 
Costa, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Cruz. Eight more were 
in the bottom quartile at least seven times: Marin (appearing nine 
years), Imperial (appearing eight years), and Alpine, Nevada, 
Sacramento, San Benito, Sonoma, and Stanislaus (appearing seven 
years). I used all ten years of data for any county listed above, even 
those with some yearly data not in the top quartile. I did so because 
the purpose of this study is to discover whether there is something 
inherent in these particular counties, not to explore what might have 
happened in anomalous years.69 
I then divided the state based on calculated numbers of surplus 
NFA. The ultimate focus of this Article is on the use of state prison 
resources. Because small counties with high coverage rates 
nevertheless consume very little of the state’s ten billion dollar prison 
budget, this measure accounted for gross numbers of each county’s 
prison usage not justified by violent crime. That is, this variable 
measured the size of the problem—how many surplus NFA a given 
county was sending to prison each year. As explained above, surplus 
NFA was calculated by multiplying a county’s reported violent crime 
rate by the state coverage rate for that year, which yields a “crime 
justified” number of NFA. This yields the average statewide carceral 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See infra Appendix A for a complete list of all counties. See also infra Appendix B for a map of 
the counties. 
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reaction to a particular level of violent crime. I subtracted this 
amount from a county’s actual NFA to get the surplus NFA (or, for 
negative numbers, the NFA deficit). 
As with coverage, I looked at counties that appeared in the top or 
bottom quartile more than seven times. Counties appearing in the top 
surplus NFA quartile were as follows: Kern, Kings, Orange, 
Riverside, San Bernardino, and Santa Clara appeared all ten years; 
Butte, Fresno, Shasta and Sutter were appeared nine out of ten years; 
Placer and Santa Barbara appeared seven out of ten years. Counties 
in the bottom quartile were as follows: Alameda, Contra Costa, 
Sacramento, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Cruz appeared all 
ten years; Imperial, Los Angeles, and Marin appeared nine of ten 
years; and Nevada, San Diego, Sonoma, and Stanislaus appeared 
seven of ten years. I included data from all ten years for each county 
in the top and bottom group. San Diego appeared twice in the top 
quartile for surplus NFA, which shows that these figures are sensitive 
to small changes in coverage for counties with large populations. 
Initial analysis revealed that both coverage and surplus top and 
bottom quartiles exhibited similar responsiveness to the key variables 
in my analysis. I grouped them together in what I call the Low Use 
and High Use groups respectively. High Use counties, in other 
words, contain counties with high coverage, high surplus NFA, or 
both. Low Use counties contain counties with low coverage, NFA 
deficits, or both. I will discuss general observations about these 
groups in the following section.70 
Because Los Angeles is such a large county, I decided to calculate 
results for the Low Use group without it, even though Los Angeles 
had an NFA deficit in nine of the ten years of the study. Exempting 
Los Angeles also ensured that the populations of the High and Low 
Use groups would be relatively similar—and relatively similar to that 
of Los Angeles—and thus that contrasts between them could be more 
readily observed.71 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See infra Part II. 
 71. Los Angeles’ average total population from 2000 to 2009 was 10.1 million, and the adult 
population at risk for Los Angeles was 6.6 million. The Low Use population was 10.2 million with 6.8 
million at risk, and the High Use population was 11.7 million with 7.6 million at risk. 
30
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4
2012] TOUGH ON CRIME 1017 
This leaves twenty five other counties, with a combined average 
population of 4.5 million that did not appear more than seven times 
in either the top or bottom quartile of either coverage or surplus 
NFA. While the bulk of my analysis will focus on the other three 
segments of California, I briefly note that this group is 
heterogeneous. For example, Merced and Yolo are both members of 
this group and have almost identical NFA numbers, and yet Yolo has 
less violent crime (and property and Part I crime) than Merced, 
giving it a much higher coverage rate. Several counties appeared in 
the top coverage quartile more than four times: Modoc and Yuba 
(appearing six of ten years); Plumas, Sierra, and Siskiyou (appearing 
five of ten years); and Amador, Calaveras, and Tuolomne (appearing 
four of ten years). Only one county appeared more than four times in 
the bottom quartile: Monterey (appearing five of ten years). 
Table 2: Demographics of the Four State Segments, Average 
Yearly Values 2000–2009 
 High 
Use 
Low Use Los 
Angeles 
Middle 
Use 
State 
Total 
Population 
(millions) 
11.74 10.17 10.07 4.53 36.51 
APAR 
Population 
(millions) 
7.62 6.81 6.55 3.00 23.98 
Prison 
Population 
55,079 37,023 54,187 17,612 164,000 
Number 
of 
Counties 
18 14 1 25 58 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on ten-
year averages.72 
 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (“ tab “Stats by County Segment”). 
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All data was prepared in Excel. I then used Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) to draw histograms and scatterplots, using 
linear regression models and linear fit lines. Syntax for my SPSS 
work has been posted to the folder with the rest of my data.73 
II. VIOLENT CRIME RATES AND NEW FELON ADMISSION RATES 
Although violent crime rates and NFA rates are correlated on a 
statewide level, reported violent crime does not sufficiently explain 
why counties have such disparate NFA rates. Why do counties 
respond to violent crime so differently? Throughout this section, I 
will use the coverage variable as my proxy variable for a county’s 
carceral response to violent crime. 
I begin with a discussion of the statewide numbers, and then I 
examine High Use counties, Low Use counties, Los Angeles County, 
and the rest of the state. 
A. The State 
In this section, I will first demonstrate that some counties 
systematically incarcerate at different rates. I will then look at 
whether reported violent crime explains this differential usage at the 
statewide level. 
First, counties send people to prison at different rates, even 
without correcting for crime. Figure 2 plots NFA rates, normalized to 
100,000 APAR. The chart looks at all fifty-eight counties for all ten 
years of data and counts the number of instances counties reported a 
particular NFA rate. 
                                                                                                                 
 73.  W. DAVID BALL, Final Charts syntax (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 
(follow Final Charts syntax with split.sps hyperlink). 
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Figure 2: Frequency of NFA Rates/100K APAR, 2000–2009 
 
 
The shape of the histogram is relatively normal, although high 
NFA counties skew the distribution right. If individual counties were 
in these ranges an equal amount of time, the distribution would be 
normal as well. Certain counties, however, appear consistently in the 
top and bottom quartiles. Some counties consistently send people to 
prison at greater rates than others. 
But NFA only tells part of the story. NFA looks normal when 
compared to population. NFA as a function of reported violent crime 
presents a more chaotic picture. Figure 3 plots NFA rates and rates of 
reported violent crime for all fifty-eight counties and all ten years. 
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Figure 3: Violent Crime to NFA (Rates, 100,000 APAR), 2000–
2009 
 
 
Although the relationship of the Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 
APAR is statistically significant at the one percent level, it is not a 
significant statistic. The amount of variance it explains is minute 
(r^2=.032, which means changes in Violent Crime rates explain 3.2 
% of the variance in NFA rates), and the standard error is relatively 
large (root mean squared error (RMSE) = 98.50139). What does this 
mean? The scatterplot data shows that, although a linear fit line can 
be drawn, the data does not cluster around it and the relationship is 
barely above zero. In other words, if we were to use violent crime 
rates to predict NFA rates at the county level, the amount it would 
predict would be very small. 
The correlation between crime and NFA might be weak because 
county type dominates any effects crime might have. That is, violent 
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crime itself does not make a county High or Low Use. However, we 
might still see that changes in reported violent crime does, in fact, 
predict changes in NFA within county types. For example, more 
crime in a Low Use county might result in more NFA, and less crime 
in a High Use county might result in fewer NFA. The following chart 
shows what happens to the crime-NFA relationship within the state 
once counties are divided by county type. 
 
Figure 4: Violent Crime to NFA (Rates, 100,000 APAR), 2000–
2009, By County Type 
 
 
Here we see that there is a much more robust correlation between 
crime and NFA within county type, with an r2 of .243 for Low Use 
counties (including Los Angeles) and an r2 of .189 for High Use 
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counties (both statistically significant at the 1 percent level).74 This 
means that within county types variance in crime explains 
approximately twenty percent of variance in NFA. Crucially, we 
have also already seen that without dividing the state, variance in 
crime only explains roughly three percent of variance in NFA. 
County types dominate the effects of crime at the statewide level. 
Without subdividing the state by county type, crime explains very 
little about NFA. There is no statewide story about “the typical 
California response to crime,” just sub-stories within segments of the 
state. Violent crime does not make a county High Use or Low Use: it 
only operates to change relative usage within those segments. 
B.   Violent Crime and NFA in the Four State Segments 
Crime rates do not explain why some segments have higher NFA 
and higher total prison populations than others. High Use counties 
have below average crime, and Low Use counties have above 
average crime. 
I looked at criminal justice statistics for each of the four segments 
(High Use, Low Use, Los Angeles, and Middle Use) to see what, 
besides levels of state prison usage, distinguishes them in hopes of 
shedding light on why each segment uses state prison resources at 
such different rates. This analysis is largely descriptive, not 
predictive. 
                                                                                                                 
 74. The data is still relatively scattered, with an RMSE of 51.83820 and 76.20699 for Low and High 
Use counties respectively. Middle Use counties, not pictured, have an r^2 of .239, also statistically 
significant at the one percent level. 
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Table 3: Crime Rates and Prison Usage, Average Yearly Values, 
2000–2009 
 High 
Use 
Low 
Use 
Los 
Angeles 
Middle 
Use 
State 
Average 
Violent 
Crime  
622.67 835.94 1,128.27 609.13 819.70 
 
Property 
Crime 
2,618.73 3,134.31 2,780.05 2,296.28 2,768.84 
 
Part I 
Crime 
5243.54 6404.46 5494.90 4881.71 5,596.56 
 
NFA 223.57 122.04 211.87 167.99 184.58 
VC 
Coverage 
Rate 
35.90% 
 
14.60% 18.78% 27.58% 22.52% 
 
Total 
Prison 
Population 
723.13 
 
543.63 826.68 586.48 683.36 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except VC 
Coverage Rate are calculated per 100,000 APAR. State averages 
include Los Angeles County.75 
 
California counties that incarcerate the most do not have the 
highest violent crime, property crime, or total Part I crime rates in the 
state. In fact, all three rates are below the state average. What is 
more, both Low Use counties and Los Angeles have higher violent, 
property, and Part I crime rates while maintaining lower NFA rates. 
Low Use counties’ NFA rates are slightly more than half those of 
High Use counties, even though each measure of crime in Low Use 
counties is approximately twenty percent higher. The Middle Use 
counties have the lowest crime rates in all three categories but still 
incarcerate at substantially higher rates than the Low Use counties. 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”). 
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The chart also demonstrates the importance of choosing what 
measure to use to justify incarceration. Los Angeles has a significant 
violent crime problem, so according to the method used in this study, 
its NFA are justified. In fact, Los Angeles could justify more NFA on 
the basis of its reported violent crime rate. Because Los Angeles has 
a significant violent crime problem, its coverage rate is half of that of 
High Use counties. However, property and Part I crime rates in Los 
Angeles County are at the state average. On these alternative 
measures of crime, Los Angeles is at the state average, so its NFA 
rate expressed in terms of property crime coverage or Part I coverage 
would be unjustified. 
What about the composition of violent crime? Could it be that 
High Use counties experience worse types of violent crime? The 
answer is no. As seen in Table 4, rates of all four categories of 
violent crime are below the state average in High Use counties. More 
importantly, the numbers of more serious crimes are not high enough 
to drive differences in NFA. There simply are not that many rapes 
and homicides to account for the difference, even if High Use 
counties had a 100% clearance rate on those crimes. 
Table 4: Average Yearly NFA and Violent Crime Rates, by 
Offense, 2000–2009 
 High 
Use 
Low 
Use 
Los 
Angeles 
Middle 
Use 
State 
Average 
NFA 223.57 122.04 211.87 167.99 184.58 
 
Homicide 6.81 8.66 14.91 6.54 9.51 
 
Forcible 
Rape 
37.41 42.36 37.85 41.34 39.43 
 
Robbery 173.83 293.87 423.43 139.60 271.84 
Aggravated 
Assault 
404.62 491.05 652.07 421.65 498.92 
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Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except VC 
Coverage Rate are calculated per 100,000 APAR. State averages 
include Los Angeles County.76 
 
I will now discuss each of the segments of the state in greater 
detail, describing how they are different and what impact each has on 
the overall state prison population. 
1.   High Use Counties: Dominated by NFA Surplus Counties 
The High Use counties are made up of three more or less equal 
numbers of counties: those in the top quartile of coverage, those in 
the top quartile of NFA surplus, and those who were in both. Though 
the numbers of counties are similar, their populations are not. The 
counties in the NFA surplus group are the overwhelming source of 
this segment’s population, and will get the majority of the analysis. 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
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Table 5: High Use Counties, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009 
 High 
Coverage 
High 
Surplus 
NFA 
Both High 
Use 
Total 
State 
Total 
High 
Use as 
% of 
State 
Total 
Population 
(millions) 
.18 10.94 .62 11.74 36.51 32.16% 
 
Number of 
Counties 
6 8 4 18 58 31.03% 
Prison 
Population 
1,085 49,391 4,603 
 
55,079 164,000 33.60% 
 
NFA 271.68 215.75 344.10 223.57 184.58 38.46% 
Violent 
Crime 
497.50 
 
626.19 
 
598.84 
 
622.67 819.70 24.12% 
Coverage 
Rate 
54.61% 
 
34.45% 
 
57.46% 
 
35.90% 
 
22.52% N/A 
Part I 
Crime 
Rate 
3,882.92 5,274.60 5,109.53 5,243.54 5,596.56 29.75% 
 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. NFA, Violent Crime, 
and Part I Crime Rate are calculated per 100,000 APAR off 10-year 
averages. State averages include Los Angeles County.77 
 
Counties in the “high coverage” and “both” groups are generally 
too small to make much of a difference statewide. High coverage 
counties in particular are not populated enough to make much of an 
impact on the state’s prison population or on its bottom line. The 
counties with both high coverage and high NFA surplus are also 
small, but they incarcerate at such high coverage rates that they 
nevertheless manage to make it into the top quartile of surplus NFA. 
NFA rates for the “both” group are nearly twice that of the state 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. 
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average (344.1 versus 184.58), even though violent crime rates are 
just three-quarters of the state rate (598.84 versus 819.70).78 This 
yields a coverage rate more than twice that of the state average 
(57.46% versus 22.52%).79 These counties are so far out of step with 
the rest of the state that despite having just over 620,000 people, the 
average yearly total subsidy for this group of counties is almost thirty 
million dollars.80 
The NFA surplus group is relatively tame by comparison, 
incarcerating at a coverage rate only fifty percent more than the state 
average. In fact, looking at NFA rates alone (184.58 for the state, 
215.75 for the NFA surplus group), the subsidy group does not 
appear to be so unusual. But these NFA figures are higher despite the 
fact that the justifications for prison—crime rates—are below the 
state average in all three major categories of violent crime, property 
crime (not pictured), and Part I crime. Again, this underscores the 
fundamental difference between looking at prison usage alone—i.e., 
NFA rates—and tying that usage to its justification. In some cases, 
looking at NFA rates based on county population alone can obscure 
the fact that a county lacks a crime-based justification for the level of 
incarceration it uses. 
2.   High Surplus Revisited: The Rich Four and the Poor Four 
The high surplus counties can be further divided on the basis of 
income. These counties divide neatly into two groups of four, both 
with roughly the same population. The “Rich Four” counties are 
Orange, Placer, Santa Barbara, and Santa Clara. Three of these 
counties reported incomes above the state per capita average for each 
of the ten years in the study. One of them, Santa Barbara, was above 
the state average seven times and missed by less than $617 the other 
three times. The “Poor Four” counties are Fresno, Kern, Riverside, 
and San Bernardino. Each of these counties reported incomes below 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See supra Table 5; supra Table 6. 
 79. See supra Table 5; supra Table 6. 
 80. See infra Table 19 and accompanying text. 
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the state per capita average for all ten years, with none coming within 
$8,000 of the state average in any of those years. 
Table 6: The Rich Four and the Poor Four, Average Yearly 
Values, 2000-2009 
 Rich Four Poor Four State Total 
Population 
(millions) 
5.52 5.42 36.51 
APAR 
Population 
(millions) 
3.68 3.40 23.98 
Prison 
Population 
17,280 32,111 164,000 
NFA 149.31 287.46 184.58 
Violent 
Crime Rate 
442.79 824.17 819.70 
 
Property 
Crime Rate 
1,887.55 3,447.97 2,768.84 
 
Part I Crime 
Rate 
3,967.13 6,686.01 5,596.56 
 
Coverage 33.72% 34.88% 22.52% 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on ten-
year averages.81 
 
This chart reveals how coverage changes the analysis. The Rich 
Four and Poor Four have dramatically different NFA rates, but 
because they also have dramatically different violent crime rates, 
their coverage rates are very similar. If one looked only at NFA rates 
per 100,000 APAR, the Rich Four appear to use very little prison, 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”; Rich Four figures 
begin on line 220). 
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with an NFA around nineteen percent below the state average. The 
problem is that the Rich Four’s violent crime rate is approximately 
forty-six percent below the state average. The Rich Four incarcerate 
less than the state average, but not as little as their crime rate 
indicates. Overuse is relative, and below-average NFA can be high 
use if a county’s crime rate is sufficiently low. 
The Poor Four, on the other hand, have violent crime rates slightly 
above the state average, but their NFA rate is more than fifty percent 
greater than the state’s NFA. They are justified in incarcerating at a 
slightly higher rate, but not nearly as much as they do. Again, 
looking at NFA rates themselves obscures the fact that violent crime 
is not driving rates of incarceration. 
The Rich Four and the Poor Four are a drain on the rest of the 
state. To the extent that these counties are being subsidized for prison 
usage that cannot be explained by reported violent crime, the Rich 
Four in particular cannot justify their subsidy on the basis of need. It 
would be difficult to argue that these counties are due a larger share 
of the state prison budget either because they cannot afford it or 
because crime demands that they do so. In fact, the Rich Four can 
afford to fund their prisons independently and the counties are 
relatively safe. The Poor Four do not have the same resources as the 
Rich Four, but they consume many more prison resources than the 
Rich Four and more than the state coverage rate would indicate. To 
the extent the state needs to focus on overcrowding, however, these 
are the counties that incarcerate at a high rate and in large numbers. 
3.   Low Use Counties: The Convergence of Low Coverage and 
NFA Deficits 
Low Use counties are clustered in the “both” category of both low 
coverage and NFA deficits—that is, negative surplus NFA numbers. 
The eleven counties that contain most of the Low Use counties’ 
population also have the lowest coverage rates, meaning they have 
large NFA deficits. All members of the Low Use group pay a 
substantial prison tax. 
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Table 7: Low Use Counties, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009 
 Low 
Coverage 
NFA 
Deficits 
(minus 
L.A.) 
Both Low Use 
Total 
State 
Total 
Low Use 
as % of 
State 
Total 
Population 
(millions) 
.06 3.03 7.08 10.17 36.51 27.85% 
 
Number of 
Counties 
2 1 11 14 58 24.14% 
Prison 
Population 
1,262 12,713 24,183 37,023 164,000 22.59% 
 
NFA Rate 124.53 140.93 113.89 122.04 184.58 18.77% 
Violent 
Crime 
Rate 
648.35 
 
671.93 908.08 
 
835.94 
 
819.70 28.96% 
 
Coverage 
Rate 
19.21% 
 
20.97% 
 
12.54% 
 
14.60% 
 
22.52% N/A 
Part I 
Crime 
Rate 
4,340.26 5,051.86 7,003.53 6404.46 
 
5,596.56 32.49% 
 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. NFA,Violent Crime, and 
Part I Crime Rate are calculated per 100,000 APAR off 10 year 
averages. State averages include Los Angeles County.82 
 
As stated earlier, Los Angeles was in the NFA surplus bottom 
quartile but is being excluded for other reasons, leaving this group 
with only San Diego in the NFA deficit category. San Diego has 
violent and Part I crime rates well below the state average, and a 
coverage rate around 1.5% below the state average. Because it is a 
populous county, however, small changes in coverage result in large 
changes to the calculated NFA surplus. For example, San Diego 
appeared in the top quartile for NFA surplus twice, but because it 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”). 
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was in the bottom quartile seven years, I included it in the Low Use 
list. The low coverage counties, Alpine and San Benito, are too small 
to be worthy of commentary. 
The rest of the counties in the group are relatively populous. The 
“both” counties have a coverage rate equaling a third of the coverage 
rate in High Use counties. These counties have violent crime and Part 
I crime rates well above the state average, while their NFA is just 
two-thirds of the state average. In these counties, which constitute 
twenty percent of the state’s population, higher violent crime rates 
are associated with lower prison use. 
4.   Low Coverage and NFA Deficits Divided by Income: The High 
Five and the Low Six 
These counties can be divided into relatively equal populations on 
the basis of income, but they do not divide as neatly as the High Use 
counties. Including only the counties below the state per capita 
income level in all ten years would have resulted in an unequal 
division of population. Thus, I added two counties with the next 
lowest incomes—Nevada and Sonoma—to the four counties with 
below-average incomes (Imperial, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and 
Stanislaus). The richer five counties are Alameda, Contra Costa, 
Marin, San Francisco, and Santa Cruz. 
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Table 8: Dividing Low Coverage, NFA Deficit Counties, 
Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009 
 Low Six High Five State Total 
Population 
(millions) 
3.23 3.85 36.51 
APAR 
Population 
(millions) 
2.09 2.64 23.98 
Prison 
Population 
14,797 9,386 164,000 
NFA 158.09 78.96 184.58 
Violent 
Crime Rate 
961.07 866.2 819.70 
 
Property 
Crime Rate 
3744.92 2952.36 2,768.84 
 
Part I Crime 
Rate 
7,521.39 6,594.29 5,596.56 
 
Coverage 16.45% 9.12% 22.52% 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on ten-
year averages.83 
 
Table 8 summarizes the differences between the two groups. Note 
that the distribution of crime among these counties does not track 
income group as it did with the Rich Four and the Poor Four. Both 
sets of crime rates are above the state average, and they are more or 
less equally distributed on either side: Marin (rich) and Nevada 
(poor) have violent crime rates in the 300’s, Alameda and San 
Francisco (rich), Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus (poor) 
have violent crime rates above 1000, and Contra Costa and Santa 
Cruz (rich), Imperial and Sonoma (poor) are in the 500 and 600’s.84 
Coverage rates are generally lower in the high income areas, 
however, as are NFA. 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. 
 84. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “All Data 10y avg as #s”). 
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5.   Los Angeles 
Los Angeles County is atypically large, accounting for slightly less 
than a third of the state’s population and about a third of its prison 
population, but its prison usage is not atypically high when its high 
violent crime rate is taken into account. On a per capita basis, L.A.’s 
NFA rate is higher than the state average. However, its violent crime 
rate is almost fifty percent greater than the state average. The 
coverage variable expresses this relationship more simply: L.A.’s 
coverage rate is less than the state average, and about half that of the 
High Use counties. L.A. does have below average property and Part I 
crime rates, however, and an analysis that does not center on violent 
crime might conclude that L.A.’s prison usage is not justified. 
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Figure 4: Los Angeles County and the Rest of the State, 2000-
200985 
 
 
The above chart summarizes L.A.’s relationship to the rest of the 
state graphically. L.A. comes in generally at about forty to fifty 
percent of the rest of the state numbers, except for violent crime in 
the early part of the past decade. 
6.   Middle Use Counties 
The populations of these counties are in the small to medium 
range, spanning from tiny Sierra County to relatively populous San 
Mateo and Ventura counties. Yearly coverage rates bounce around, 
reaching lows of about one-third of the state coverage rate and highs 
of several times the state rate. Annual NFA rates range from less than 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See supra note 27 (chart taken from COUNTY COMPARISONS (tab “LA Chart”); chart data based 
on TOUGH CHART DATA (tab “All Data”). 
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100 to more than 400 in particular years. These counties were ones 
that might have particular years—or even several years—of High or 
Low Use that nevertheless did not exhibit the kind of consistency 
(seven of ten years) required for inclusion into either group. 
III. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
This section explores factors other than violent crime that could 
have caused disparities in prison use. I first look at whether counties 
are sentencing different types of offenders to state prison. That is, 
perhaps the violent crime/NFA disparity among groups of counties is 
a result of High Use counties sending more property offenders to 
prison, or perhaps Low Use counties send fewer violent offenders to 
prison. I conclude that this is not the case. I then look at the number 
of drug offenders sent to prison. Because I have already looked at 
property crime and Part I crime (the general crime rate), and because 
other types of crime (notably sex offenses) are not numerous enough 
to account for the disparity, I consider whether drug offenders 
account for the difference between High Use and Low Use counties. I 
then look at law enforcement, using general arrest data as a crude 
proxy for how active a force is, to try to explore whether high 
coverage is simply a matter of more active (or effective) law 
enforcement. I next look to in-county dispositions—jail and 
probation—to see if differential usage of these resources explains 
differences in prison usage. I next look at local resources—using per 
capita income as a proxy—as a means of exploring whether counties 
rely on prison because they do not have the money to do anything 
else. I examine the role of politics by analyzing voter registration 
numbers, to see if party politics or levels of participation might 
explain what is different about different segments of the state. 
From time to time, I will discuss state segments as they bear on the 
variables in question. These factors will not operate similarly across 
counties—California is a huge, diverse place. The principal statistical 
inquiry was, of course, whether violent crimes explain differences in 
prison usage. This part attempts to shed some light on what might 
49
Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1036 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
explain differences in usage, although it should be seen only as a 
very preliminary investigation. 
A.   Offender Mix 
I have thus far examined only violent crime and new felon 
admissions (NFA) and concluded that High Use counties are over-
incarcerating relative to the state average and Low Use counties are 
under-incarcerating relative to the state average. But it could be the 
case that these differences in NFA levels can be explained by the 
types of offenders being sent to prison—what I will call the “offender 
mix” of a county’s prison population. Perhaps High Use and Low 
Use counties respond at the same rate to violent crimes, but their 
responses to property and drug crimes explain why High Use 
counties use prison at a greater rate. That is, perhaps High Use 
counties spend a greater percentage of prison resources on drug and 
property offenders.86 It could also be true that Low Use counties’ 
lower NFA rates are not necessarily the result of them ignoring 
violent crime but a result of having lower NFA numbers for non-
violent offenses. In other words, Low Use counties might be laser-
focused on violent crime and use prison for those offenses alone. 
In this section I use non-public data from the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as part of an official 
request from the Offender Information Services Unit (OIS).87 The 
data contains all county commitments to state prison for the years 
2000-2009. The data includes offense, offense category, and sentence 
lengths. Because the categories used by the CDCR (e.g. Crimes 
Against Persons) include different offenses from those in the FBI’s 
UCR categories (e.g. Violent Crimes), I recoded the offense 
categories to try to match crime reporting data.88 I note also that the 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Alternatively, it might be the case that, say, a given High Use county has a huge problem with 
property offenses. Their resulting incarceration rate might not be an overreaction to violent crime, but a 
rational response to property offenses. These property NFA would distort the coverage rate (violent 
crime to NFA) and give misleading results. 
 87. W. DAVID BALL, SENTENCE LENGTHS DB DEC. 2011 (2011), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 (follow Sentence Lengths DB Dec. 2011.xls hyperlink); 
see also infra Part IV.B. 
 88. The CDCR categories in the data I received were Crimes Against Persons, Drug Crimes, 
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numbers of offenders in the CDCR OIS data are slightly higher than 
the yearly numbers from the CDCR’s published statistics (between 
1.5 and 5.5 percent).89 Accordingly, I will refrain from comparing 
prison population numbers from the two sources. I nevertheless will 
report results from the OIS and make comparisons within this data 
set. 
Table 9: NFA Offender Mix, Total Values, 2000-2009 
 High 
Use 
Low 
Use 
Los 
Angeles 
Middle Use State Total 
Violent 
Crimes as 
% of 
Segment 
NFA 
13.54%
  
19.22%
  
18.97%  14.64%
  
16.43% 
Property 
Crimes as 
% of 
Segment 
NFA 
16.97%
  
18.43%
  
18.74%  14.67%
  
17.54% 
                                                                                                                 
Property Crimes, Other Crimes, and Uncategorized. Crimes Against Persons includes certain sex 
offenses not included in the FBI’s Violent Crimes definition (e.g. oral copulation, other sex offenses, 
and sodomy). See UCR Offense Definitions, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING STATISTICS, 
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). For Violent Crimes, I included all 
forms of homicide (including vehicular manslaughter), robbery, rape, and assault with a deadly weapon. 
I did not include kidnapping or other assault/battery. For Property Crimes, I included first and second-
degree burglary, grand theft, and motor vehicle theft. For Part I, I included all crimes above and added 
arson and petty theft with a prior offense. I put other violent and property crimes in separate categories 
(Other Violent and Other Property), made a separate category for Sex Offenses, and put DUIs and 
weapons possession charges in Other Crimes. 
 89. The OIS numbers include all offenders sentenced in a given year, whereas the CDCR’s 
published statistics are simply a year-end population count. Because some offenders served less than 
one year during the period of the study, more offenders were sentenced in a given year than were 
reflected in the year-end head count. I note again that these figures are for sentenced new felon 
admissions—they do not include parole violators. I say this only to distinguish short-term NFA 
sentences from short-term parole violation sentences. 
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Part I as % 
of Segment 
NFA 
33.90%
  
41.58% 42.95% 33.70%
  
38.13% 
Drug 
Crimes as 
% of 
Segment 
NFA 
31.18% 27.63% 28.12% 27.08% 29.09% 
Sex 
Offenses as 
% of NFA 
5.52% 6.01% 4.00% 6.77% 5.29% 
Other 
Violent 
Offenses as 
% of NFA 
9.25% 7.74% 6.73% 10.57% 8.33% 
Other 
Property 
Offenses as 
% of NFA 
8.80% 6.40% 6.53% 9.01% 7.66% 
Other 
Offenses as 
% of NFA 
11.36% 10.65% 11.67% 12.87% 11.49% 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on ten-
year totals provided by the CDCR OIS. Crime categories based on 
FBI definitions.90 
 
Based on the data, we can reject the theory that High Use counties 
are incarcerating more because they focus on violent offenders. High 
Use counties do not spend a greater percentage of their prison 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See BALL supra note 87. 
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resources incarcerating violent offenders, or even Part I offenders. 
High Use and Middle Use counties have a much lower percentage of 
violent and Part I crimes in their offender mix (albeit off a higher 
base rate of incarceration). Low Use counties and Los Angeles 
concentrate their prison usage on Part I crimes, with over forty-two 
percent of their NFA coming from this category. High Use counties 
have greater percentages of drug offenders in their offender pool, as 
well as larger numbers of “other” violent and property crimes (those 
crimes which are not part of the FBI property and violent crime 
categories). These are escape, forgery/fraud, kidnapping, other 
assault/battery, other property offenses, and receiving stolen 
property. 
Historical information about offender mix will become particularly 
important as California undergoes realignment,91 because, moving 
forward, counties will only be able to sentence those who have 
committed violent, sexual, or serious offenses to state prison. Thus, 
there may be a separate value in isolating what percentage of 
offenders from each county would be prison-eligible after 
realignment and use that as a historical baseline for comparing pre- 
and post-realignment NFA and offender mix. Using Part I crimes as a 
rough proxy, it appears that a greater number of High Use admissions 
from 2000-2009 would be ineligible for prison under the new 
realignment guidelines. All other things being equal (especially 
reported violent crime), one should expect post-realignment prison 
commitments in High Use counties to decrease by a greater rate than 
in Low Use counties. If they do not, that might suggest that these 
counties have responded to realignment by changing other policies, 
such as those relating to charging and sentencing. 
B. Effectiveness 
As we have seen, differences in violent crime rates inadequately 
explain differences in NFA rates.92 In this section, I look at other 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See discussion infra Part V. 
 92. In Table 18, I also calculate reported Property Crime and Part I Crime coverage rates, concluding 
that these crime rates also inadequately explain differences in NFA rates. See infra Table 18. 
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types of crimes—notably drug crimes—for a possible explanation. 
As stated earlier, drug crimes themselves are not reported. Therefore 
I will use drug arrests as a very crude measurement of actual drug 
crimes. There are obvious problems with this method because arrests 
are never a complete—or accurate—measure of any criminal activity. 
Because drugs are such a big part of the prison system, however, I 
have decided to attempt an explanation rather than avoid the subject 
entirely. This analysis, however, should be taken even more 
provisionally than the rest of this Article. In this section, I will also 
look at the percentage of reported crimes that result in actual prison 
sentences to help isolate what happens between the report of a crime 
and sentencing. 
 
Arrest data might be used as a proxy for law enforcement activity, 
law enforcement effectiveness, and/or for differences in policing 
strategies. One might associate higher arrest rates with broken 
windows style policing, or perhaps lower rates with a less active (or 
more cautious) force. Without getting into the merits of different 
policing strategies, this section analyzes whether policing inputs 
could explain differences in NFA. For Table 10, I calculated arrest 
coverage rates for reported violent and property crimes. These 
coverage rates measured the number of arrests per reported crime. I 
compared these arrest coverage figures with clearance rates (the 
percentage of cases deemed closed). 
Table 10: Arrest Data, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009 
 High 
Use 
Low Use Los 
Angeles 
Middle 
Use 
State Average 
NFA 223.57 122.04 
 
211.87 167.99 184.58 
 
Total Offense 
Arrests 
1,802.26 1,864.45 
 
1,858.76 
 
1,730.58 
 
1,826.38 
 
Violent 
Offense 
458.77 
 
452.07 
 
502.76 
 
461.47 
 
469.22 
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Arrests 
Arrest 
Coverage of 
Reported 
Violent 
Crimes 
73.68% 
 
54.08% 44.56% 
 
75.76% 
 
57.24% 
 
Violent 
Crime 
Clearance 
Rate 
47.36% 41.69% 44.81% 50.46% 45.05% 
Property 
Offense 
Arrests 
472.42 
 
481.17 
 
473.75 
 
418.01 
 
468.46 
 
Arrest 
Coverage of 
Property 
Crimes 
18.04% 
 
15.35% 17.04% 
 
18.20% 
 
16.92% 
 
Sex Offense 
Arrests 
36.06 
 
28.27 
 
26.93 
 
37.00 
 
31.47 
 
Drug Arrests 532.34 
 
565.52 
 
592.97 
 
473.87 
 
551.01 
 
Dangerous 
Drugs Arrests 
354.15 
 
260.34 
 
220.65 
 
301.69 
 
284.46 
 
Weapons 
Arrests 
69.33 
 
63.19 
 
80.52 
 
69.94 
 
70.72 
 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except 
percentages are calculated per 100,000 APAR. State averages include 
Los Angeles County.93 
 
Arrest data reveals almost no significant differences across the 
four segments for total arrests, property arrests, sex offenses, drug 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27. Most of the data comes from the tab “Stats by County 
Segment.” (NFA figures are from the tab “Rates per 100k APAR”.) Property Arrest Coverage is 
calculated in row AE beneath individual county segments (e.g., High Use Counties’ Property Arrest 
Coverage is calculated in AE170). Violent Crime Clearance Rate was calculated by filtering counties in 
the tab “All Data noStwd as #s filter” and reading GE590 (“rate”) amounts. 
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arrests, and weapons arrests. In addition, sex offense arrests are too 
infrequent to make a difference in NFA rates. Two areas which merit 
closer study are dangerous drug arrests per 100,000 APAR and the 
arrest coverage rate for violent crime. Both are much higher in High 
Use counties than in Los Angeles County or the Low Use counties. 
Higher dangerous drug arrests may suggest that the severity, if not 
the number, of drug crimes are worse in High Use areas. High Use 
counties do, in fact, have a greater percentage of drug offenders in 
their NFA pool, although the median sentence length of High Use 
drug crime sentences is at the state average, suggesting that the 
sentenced crimes are not more severe, even if arrest activity is 
greater.94 The high ratio of violent crime arrests to violent crime 
suggests that violent crimes are policed more aggressively in High 
Use counties, leading to more prosecutions and more prison time. 
High Use clearance rates are higher than in Los Angeles or the Low 
Use counties, but the difference between High and Low clearance 
rates is not nearly as large as the difference between High and Low 
Arrest Coverage, suggesting an independent carceral effect to police 
activity irrespective of the eventual disposition of the case. 
The next table examines what one might call “actual” coverage—
the number of NFA by offense compared to reported numbers of 
those offenses. Coverage is just a proxy; this chart examines the 
actual pipeline from report to sentence, sorted by crime type. 
Table 11: Reported Crimes and New Felon Admissions by 
Crime, Total Values, 2000-2009 
 High Use Low Use Los Angeles Middle 
Use 
State Total 
Total NFA 
Sentenced 
177,799 88,061 140,971 51,664 458,495 
Total Reported 
Violent Crimes  
474,266 569,291 739,556  182,926 1,966,039 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See supra Table 9 and accompanying text (providing data on the percentage of drug offenders as 
a proportion of NFA); infra Table 20 and accompanying text (providing data on sentence length). 
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Total Violent 
Crime Prison 
Sentences 
24,082 16,925 26,741 7,565 75,313 
% Reported 
Violent Crimes 
Resulting in 
Prison 
5.08% 2.97% 3.62% 4.14% 3.83% 
Total Reported 
Property 
Crimes  
1,994,605 2,134,530 1,822,269 689,592 6,640,996 
Total Property 
Crime Prison 
Sentences 
30,174 16,229 26,422 7,577 80,402 
% Reported 
Property 
Crimes 
Resulting in 
Prison 
1.51% .76% 1.45% 1.10% 1.21% 
Total Reported 
Part I Crimes 
4,643,006 4,981,645 4,195,939 1,694,573 15,515,163 
Total Part I 
Crime Prison 
Sentences 
60,276 36,616 60,544 17,411 174,847 
% Reported 
Part I Crimes 
Resulting in 
Prison 
1.30% .74% 1.44% 1.03% 1.13% 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. Sentence figures based 
on ten-year totals provided by the CDCR OIS. Crime categories 
based on FBI definitions.95 
 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See supra note 27. The data for this chart can be found in the spreadsheet “Table 11 data”. The 
data on sentenced offenders comes from the Spreadsheet “sentence lengths db dec 2011”, beginning at 
cell N90227; the data on reported crimes comes from “Tough Chart Data March 2012,” tab “Stats by 
County Segment”. 
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The above data stands out because of the relationship of reported 
crime to prison sentences. Violent crime prison sentences as a 
percentage of reported violent crime is, even in high use counties, 
vanishingly small, with NFA accounting for, at most, just over five 
percent of reported violent crimes. This is not to say, of course, that 
there are few crimes solved. I note from the prior table that clearance 
rates are well into the double digits. These numbers could be 
explained in part by serial offenders, each responsible for multiple 
crimes, meaning each NFA would account for several reported 
crimes. Note, too, that these numbers only refer to prison, not 
punishment, effectiveness, or clearance in general. That is, this data 
illuminates where offenders are punished—not whether they are 
punished. Counties might sentence offenders to jail or probation, they 
might drop charges, and, of course, a significant number of crimes go 
unsolved.96 Having said that, violent offenders in High Use counties 
are still more likely to get prison time than violent offenders in Low 
Use counties, even though both figures are relatively small. 
But, even if we were to assume that prison usage is somehow 
correlated with effectiveness (even at these low levels) and that High 
Use counties devote more energy and resources towards fighting 
crime—and do so more effectively—responding to violent crime 
aggressively is still a policy response to violent crime, not a 
necessary function of it. Accordingly, this policy—as with all good 
policies—is subject to the key question: why should the state pay for 
it? If it is good policy,97 after all, the county should happily make the 
investment itself. The individual county is the polity that made the 
choice to deal with crime in this fashion, and the individual county is 
the polity that will benefit. The issue is not whether the policies in 
question are good or bad. The issue is why the state should pay for 
something it has no control over, a policy that benefits a readily 
identifiable subset of the population (the county) which drew up and 
implemented the policy. Even if we were to think the state should be 
subsidizing these kinds of choices, questions remain: why subsidize 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See infra Part IV. 
 97. If it is, in fact, a policy and not either random or inadvertent. 
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these counties and not others, and these policies and not others? Or, 
is the state willing and able to subsidize all counties who wish to 
make this choice?98 
C.   Local Dispositions 
On a zero-sum view of offender management, one might expect 
that lower use of prison would result in higher use of jail and 
probation. In other words, offenders not sent to prison would simply 
go elsewhere in the system. That is not the case, however. High Use 
counties use jails at higher rates than Low Use counties, suggesting 
that High Use counties are simply more punitive and use 
incarceration at a higher rate irrespective of whether the county or 
state pays for it. As for probation, there is almost no difference 
between Low Use and High Use counties along any of the 
dimensions examined—a surprising figure that might be the result of 
weaknesses in the probation data. 
1.   Jail 
Mike Males has written a comprehensive analysis of local jails and 
their ability to absorb offenders from state prisons.99 Males looked at 
county jail capacities and county offender mixes to estimate whether 
county jails could absorb the numbers of low-level offenders most 
likely to return to them under realignment, concluding that county 
jails “can provide beds for only around 38% of the 15,400 low-level, 
non-strike property and drug convicts now held in state prisons.”100 
Males’s study, unfortunately, only has data from one year (2009), 
so I was unable to incorporate his findings fully. The following table 
examines the issue using figures for jail population and jail budgets. 
The table also includes percentages of jail inmates who are sentenced 
and not sentenced. Non-sentenced inmates can be those too 
                                                                                                                 
 98. For a discussion of the fiscal implications of this question, see infra Part IV. 
 99. MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CAN CALIFORNIA COUNTY JAILS 
ABSORB LOW-LEVEL STATE PRISONERS? (2011), available at 
http://www.cjcj.org/files/Can_California_County_Jails_Absorb_Low-Level_State_Prisoners.pdf. 
 100. Id. at 4. 
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dangerous to be released before trial, those unable to post bail, or 
those awaiting processing. Because California Department of Justice 
expenditure data101 is based on a fiscal year that goes from July 1 to 
June 30,102 I averaged adjacent years to calculate an estimated yearly 
total. That is, figures for 2000 are the average of 1999-2000 and 
2000-2001. There are no police expenditures for Alpine County; the 
sheriff provides the county with all of its law enforcement.103 These 
figures extend only to 2007. 
Table 12: Jail Statistics, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009 
 High Use Low Use Los Angeles Middle Use State Total 
Jail 
Population 
363.96 
 
323.30 
 
282.49 
 
353.17 
 
328.80 
 
Sentenced 121.14 115.31 92.54 137.33 113.70 
Non 
Sentenced 
242.83 207.99 189.95 215.87 215.11 
% Sentenced 33.28% 
 
35.67% 
 
32.76% 
 
38.89% 
 
34.58% 
 
% County 
CJ Budget 
Spent on Jail 
14.99% 
 
16.44% 
 
10.54% 
 
17.64% 
 
14.18% 
 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except 
Budget are calculated per 100,000 APAR; Budget figures through 
2007 only. County criminal justice budget is the sum of probation, 
jail, and law enforcement budgets.104 
 
                                                                                                                 
 101. For the entry page for the Criminal Justice Statistics Center’s county crimes data, see Statistics: 
Expenditures, 1999–2009, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/ExpenCo.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (individual county data 
was taken by following hyperlinks to each county). 
 102. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., supra note 52, at 4. 
 103. Email on file with the Georgia State University Law Review.author. 
 104. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”). “Stats by County 
Segment” figures came from filtering the tab “All Data IncStwd as #s filter”. Rates per 100,000 APAR 
were obtained via calculation in the cells marked “Segment Variable/100KVP”. 
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The jail numbers do not support the theory that Low Use counties 
are sentencing their offenders to jail rather than prison. Jail use is 
higher in both High and Middle Use counties than in Los Angeles 
and the Low Use counties. This tends to support the theory that High 
Use counties use more of all forms of incarceration, not just those 
subsidized by the state. These differences, however, are not nearly as 
stark as those involving NFA. What these population figures do not 
account for, however, is how crowded jails are, and whether these 
populations are near the jail’s capacity. Males did not adopt my 
violent crime coverage methodology, nor did he group counties by 
prison use. However, looking at his list of counties with insufficient 
space to absorb low-level state prisoners, we see that all of the Rich 
Four and three of the Poor Four (Kern, Riverside, and San 
Bernardino) are rated as having insufficient unused jail capacity to 
absorb returning prisoners.105 On the Low Use side, focusing only on 
the combined low coverage/low subsidy group, only those counties 
with incomes below the average state per capita income in all four 
years of the study (Imperial, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and 
Stanislaus) have insufficient jail space. The other seven counties have 
sufficient jail space.106 At the margin, sentencing decisions might be 
affected by local jail capacity—without jail beds, county officials 
might perhaps feel pressure to push for prison-eligible sentences and 
charges. 
Finally, I note that almost two-thirds of jail populations are non-
sentenced, which is in line with the national average.107 U.S. 
Attorney General Eric Holder recently remarked that “[a]lmost all of 
these individuals could be released and supervised in their 
communities—and allowed to pursue or maintain employment, and 
participate in educational opportunities and their normal family 
lives—without risk of endangering their fellow citizens or fleeing 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See supra note 100. MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CAN CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY JAILS ABSORB LOW-LEVEL STATE PRISONERS? (2011), available at 
http://www.cjcj.org/files/Can_California_County_Jails_Absorb_Low-Level_State_Prisoners.pdf. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Eric Tucker, Holder: Petty Offenders Should Await Trial at Home, Associated Press, June 1, 
2011, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13737523. 
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from justice.”108 The problem is that many non-sentenced offenders 
cannot make bail; Holder suggested, instead, that they be released on 
their own recognizance. The numbers suggest that at least a 
preliminary exploration of this alternative is warranted to deal with 
jail overcrowding. 
2.   Probation 
Counties use probation in dramatically different ways, and an 
entire article could be devoted to the ways in which statewide 
statistics obscure real local trends. Statewide figures on total 
probation caseloads indicate that statewide probation use has not 
changed, but several counties within the period of study have moved 
dramatically in non-random ways, expanding in some counties and 
contracting in others.109 To cite just a few examples: in Riverside 
County, total caseload almost doubled from 2000 to 2009, and new 
admissions more than doubled.110 In Santa Clara County, new 
admissions (both total and felony only) almost doubled, but total 
caseload decreased around forty percent.111 In Orange County, total 
caseload was also almost cut in half, but new admissions for felons 
stayed roughly the same.112 Probation might be one area in which 
county policies show real year-to-year variations, and it is certainly 
deserving of a much closer analysis than I give it here. 
Table 13: Probation Use by Segment, Average Yearly Values, 
2000-2009 
 High Use Low Use Los Angeles Middle Use State 
Total 
Probation 1,461.59 1,444.00 937.23 2,245.17 1,411.40 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Id. 
 109. Note that some probation data is missing. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TREND DATA FOOTNOTES (2009), available at 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/footnotes.pdf. 
 110. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “All Data noStwd as #s filter”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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Caseload     
Probation 
Budget  
$6,933 
 
$7,074 
 
$7,137 
 
$7,355 
 
$7,082 
% Felony 76.51% 79.31% 86.68% 58.90% 75.66% 
Probation 
New 
Admissions 
904.66 
 
809.95 
 
363.77 
 
1,070.32 
 
750.69 
 
% Felony 73.99% 78.40% 88.93% 60.09% 74.84% 
% County 
CJ Budget 
Spent on 
Probation 
12.34% 
 
12.10% 
 
9.38% 
 
13.46% 
 
11.40% 
 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures except 
percentage figures are calculated per 100,000 APAR. All calculations 
made on ten-year averages except budget figures, which are through 
2007 only. County criminal justice budget is the sum of probation, 
jail, and law enforcement budgets.113 
 
These numbers are, frankly, surprising. Some of the data is not 
complete, and probation data is limited to “original grants of 
probation and do[es] not include subsequent grants of probation to 
those already under supervised probation in the same county.”114 It is 
unclear, though, how the results obtained could be fully explained by 
this. I am reluctant to draw any conclusions of my own from Table 
13, but I will instead point out areas that require explanation. 
Probation budgets are almost identical, and Low Use and High Use 
counties have similar caseloads and felony populations. Los Angeles 
has fewer total probation cases and dramatically lower new 
admissions, suggesting perhaps that probation in Los Angeles County 
is longer-term than in High and Low Use counties. I am unsure 
whether there is a quality-versus-quantity story to be told here or why 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “States by County Segment”). “Stats by County 
Segment” figures came from filtering the tab “All Data IncStwd as #s filter”. Rates per 100,000 APAR 
were obtained via calculation in the cells marked “Segment Variable/100KVP”. 
 114. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
AND KNOWN LIMITATIONS (2009), available at http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/limits.pdf. 
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both probation and jail use are higher in High Use counties. This 
might also be one area where individual counties behave so 
differently within segments that patterns are not readily discernible. 
D.   Local Resources 
Local resources were measured by looking at per capita income—
both per capita income itself and the difference between per capita 
income and state per capita income. I chose not to look at gross 
population size of a county as a measure of resources. The 
relationship of Total Population to NFA rates is not statistically 
significant at the 1% level (p = .089). The amount that Total 
Population explains in NFA rates is small (r2 = .005), which means 
changes in Total Population explain less than .5% of the variance in 
NFA rates. And, the standard error is relatively large (root mean 
squared error (RMSE) = 63.35824. RMSE is a guide to how closely 
the data fits the trend line). 
Figures for per capita income were obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.115 These figures do not account for income 
inequality within a given county, which might be relevant in 
explaining crime and responses to crime, particularly where property 
crimes are concerned. I take per capita income as a measure of 
resources independent of criminal justice budgets. Note also that state 
criminal justice funding is not necessarily related to per capita 
income, where poorer counties get more resources.116 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Local Area Personal Income, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, 
http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm?selTable=CA1-3&section=2 (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) 
(selected “Per Capita Personal Income,” “California,” and the years 2000–2009). 
 116. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. As a reminder, state funding is not related to crime 
rates, either. Id. Because some funding comes from a county’s share of state sales tax revenues, we 
might expect more criminal justice resources in wealthier counties. Id. 
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Table 14: Per Capita Income by Segment, Average Yearly 
Values, 2000-2009 
 High 
Use 
Low Use Los Angeles Middle Use State Total 
Mean Per 
Capita 
Income 
$36,893 
 
$42,611 
 
$36,198 
 
$38,490 
 
$38,492 
 
Max  $60,038 $93,263 $42,195 $72,576 $93, 263 
Min $16,920 $18,973 $29,865 $18,542 $16, 920 
Standard 
Deviation 
9,013 15,103 4,313 
 
9,615 11,770 
Mean 
Difference 
From 
State 
Average 
-$1,614 
 
$4,176 
 
-$2,195 
 
$64 
 
N/A 
Max 
Difference 
$22,161 $49,410 
 
-$1,528 
 
$29,336 N/A 
Min 
Difference 
-$17,864 -$16,498 
 
-$3,533 
 
-$18,104 
 
N/A 
Standard 
Deviation 
8,374 14,437 523 
 
8,831 
 
N/A 
Figures based on county per capita income numbers and were 
weighted based on county population.117 
 
Generally, Low Use counties have higher per capita incomes: 
approximately $6,000 higher than High Use counties and Los 
Angeles.118 All income figures across all segments, however, had a 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Chart data based on filtered data in “Per capita income recalculation” spreadsheet, which took 
per capita income from “Tough Chart Data March 2012,” tab “All Data”, multiplied by total population, 
and divided total figures. 
 118. These numbers were calculated to account for county population size. I took per capita income in 
a given county for a given year and multiplied that number by the county’s population that year. I added 
these figures for a given segment of the state and divided by total population for that segment. Figures 
were not adjusted for inflation. 
65
Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1052 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
great deal of variation, and the richest group, Low Use, had the 
highest coefficient of variation. The gap between the highest and 
lowest reported county incomes for all three segments besides Los 
Angeles was at least $40,000. These same segments reported 
incomes of more than $15,000 below and $20,000 above the state per 
capita income level in a given year. Income merits further study. A 
project that divides the state into income segments might reveal 
further insights about the relationship between income levels and 
prison usage. 
Table 15: Per Capita Income of High Use Counties, Average 
Yearly Values, 2000-2009 
 High 
Coverage 
High NFA 
Surplus 
Rich Four Poor Four High 
Coverage and 
NFA Surplus 
Mean Per 
Capita 
Income 
$27,089 
 
$37,567 
 
$47,484 
 
$27,481 
 
$27,872 
 
Max  $40,721 $60,038 $60,038 $31,111 $34,432 
Min $18,021 $21,517 $33,307 $21,517 $16,920 
Mean 
Difference 
From 
State 
Average 
-$11,319 
 
-$945 
 
$9,057 
 
-$11,118 
 
-$10,593 
 
Max 
Difference 
-$1,674 
 
$22,161 
 
$22,161 
 
-$8,123 
 
-$6,699 
 
Min 
Difference 
-$17,864 
 
-$13,828 
 
-$617 
 
-$13,828 
 
-$17,455 
 
Figures based on county per capita income numbers and were 
weighted by county population.119 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Chart data based on filtered data in “Per capita income recalculation” spreadsheet, which took 
per capita income from “Tough Chart Data March 2012,” tab “All Data”, multiplied by total population, 
and divided total figures. 
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In Table 15, we see that there is a sharp divide between the Rich 
Four and the Poor Four. Three of the Rich Four counties were above 
the average state per capita income every year in the study. Santa 
Barbara was below it during only three years and even then missed it 
by no more than $617. The Poor Four, however, were at least $8,000 
below the average state per capita income level every single year. 
The best a Poor Four county did, relative to the state average, was 
still more than $7,000 less than the worst a rich county did and 
almost $30,000 less than the highest Rich Four figure. The mean 
difference between the two groups was approximately $20,000 a 
year. The Rich Four are, in fact, the only above-average income 
group of High Use counties. Neither high coverage nor high 
coverage/high NFA surplus counties ever broke above the state 
average per capita income level for even a single year. Again, the 
Rich Four have large total populations, with around fifty percent of 
the High Use segment’s total population. But none of these figures 
accounts for income differences within a county; counties 
undoubtedly have richer and poorer areas. 
Table 16: Per Capita Income of Low Coverage/Low Surplus 
Counties, Average Yearly Values, 2000-2009 
 Low Six High Five Low Use Without San 
Francisco and Marin 
Mean Per 
Capita 
Income 
$33,086 $52,295 $39,800 
Max  $47,813 $93,263 $58,228 
Min $18,973 $39,013 $18,973 
Mean 
Difference 
From State 
Average 
-$5,395 $13,900 $1,360 
Max $4,573 $49,410 $14,375 
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Difference 
Min 
Difference 
-$16,498 $4,880 -14,425 
Figures based on county per capita income numbers and were 
weighted by county population.120 
 
Low Use counties do not divide as easily as High Use counties. 
This chart looks only at the group of eleven counties with both low 
coverage and low subsidies and excludes Alpine, San Benito, and 
San Diego, as well as Los Angeles. There are four Low Use counties 
that never had incomes above the state per capita average during any 
year of the study, but an even division of this segment by population 
adds two counties with above-average incomes. The mean difference 
between the two groups is nearly $20,000, but this segment is made 
up mostly of average-income counties with two outliers: Marin 
County and San Francisco County. Recalculating the mean per capita 
income of the segment without Marin and San Francisco counties 
gives a mean per capita income of $39,800, approximately $1,500 
higher than the state average for this period. While this number is 
still above the state average, and still above that of the other three 
segments, it is lower than the mean income of the Rich Four. 
E.   Politics 
I looked at voter registration numbers for my political analysis. 
Voter registration data came from the California Secretary of State.121 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27. 
 121. For the entry page for the Voter Registration and Participation Statistics, see Voter Registration 
Statistics, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_u.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 
2011). See also CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, FEBRUARY 10, 2009 REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2009), available 
at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-09/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
JANUARY 22, 2008 REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2008), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-presprim-08/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
FEBRUARY 10, 2007 REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2007), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-07/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
JANUARY 3, 2006 REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2006), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/154day-prim-06/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
FEBRUARY 10, 2005 REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2005), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-05/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
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I used the date closest to February for years with multiple reports; 
this is because odd-numbered years only have a single registration 
report, which comes out in February. I collected percentage data on 
total registration, Democratic and Republican registration, and those 
who declined to state (as a proxy for swing voters). I calculated third 
party registration by taking these three numbers and subtracting them 
from 100; this procedure, admittedly, amalgamates third parties of 
very different political stripes and should be read as a measure of 
anti-two-party sentiment rather than, say, a measure of Green or 
Libertarian sentiments. I then calculated the political valence of a 
county by subtracting the percentage of Republicans from the 
percentage of Democrats, yielding positive numbers for Democratic 
majorities and negative numbers for Republican majorities. 
I used registration data, rather than actual voting patterns, for a 
number of reasons. First, I was wary of including data from actual 
races out of the concern that individual candidates and/or issues 
might shift turnout one way or another. Second, the data is less 
readily available. Registration figures might be seen as a general 
measure of civic engagement, and a baseline for individual attitudes. 
I acknowledge that there is a variety of opinions expressed on crime 
within parties, and that party affiliation is in no way a guarantee of 
left/right tendencies or particular attitudes about crime.122 
                                                                                                                 
FEBRUARY 17, 2004 REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2004), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-presprim-04/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
February 10, 2003 Report of Registration (2003), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-
pages/ror-odd-year-03/county.xls; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION AS OF FEBRUARY 
4, 2002 (2002), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/29day-prim-02/county.xls; 
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION AS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2001 (2001), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/ror-odd-year-01/county.pdf (Sierra County is reported as 
having more than 100 percent of its population registered to vote); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF 
REGISTRATION AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 2000 (2000), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-
pages/29day-presprim-00/county.pdf. 
 122. Of course, it sometimes does indicate something useful. The AB 109 vote in the California 
assembly, for example, was almost entirely on party lines, with all but one Democrat voting yes, and no 
Republican voting yes (one member was absent or abstained). See Comm. on Budget, Unofficial Ballot, 
AB 109 Budget, CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_vote_20110317_0532PM_asm_floor.html. Party affiliations were 
obtained at the official party websites for the California Assembly. Assembly Republican Members, 
CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY: REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, http://republican.assembly.ca.gov/?p=members (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2012); Democratic Members, CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY: DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, 
http://asmdc.org/members/democratic-members (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
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I also calculated my figures without correcting for population. I 
did so because I wanted to evaluate the party identity of a county’s 
political leadership. In other words, this method simulates the 
electoral college model, where all that matters is who finishes first, 
not the popular vote model, where the margin of victory also 
matters.123 My state figures are calculated means for the group of 580 
counties.124 
Table 17: Voter Registration by Segment, Average Yearly 
Values, 2000–2009 
 High Use Low Use Los Angeles Middle Use State 
Total 
% 
Registration 
70.73% 
 
73.88% 
 
70.97% 
 
73.95% 
 
72.88% 
 
% 
Democrats 
36.79% 
 
46.24% 
 
51.51% 
 
39.27% 
 
40.39% 
 
% 
Republicans 
43.62% 
 
31.16% 
 
26.88% 
 
39.63% 
 
38.60% 
 
Democrats 
Minus 
Republicans 
-6.83% 
 
15.08% 
 
24.63% 
 
-0.36% 
 
1.79% 
 
Decline to 
State 
14.66% 
 
17.18% 
 
17.04% 
 
15.48% 
 
15.66% 
 
Third Party 4.93% 5.42% 4.57% 5.63% 5.34% 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are not 
corrected for population; they are means of the group of counties for 
2000–2009.125 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Consider this thought experiment. If Los Angeles were 99% Democratic and every other county 
were 51% Republican, popular (population-adjusted) registration numbers would indicate a heavy 
advantage for Democrats, even though county policies would be under the direction of Republicans in 
57 counties. 
 124. Actual state numbers are slightly more Democratic: 70.70% overall, 43.97% Democratic, 
34.35% Republican, 9.62% Party Differential, 16.90% Decline to State, 4.79% Third Party. 
 125. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”). “Stats by County 
Segment” figures came from filtering the tab “All Data IncStwd as #s filter”. Rates per 100,000 APAR 
were obtained via calculation in the cells marked “Segment Variable/100KVP”. 
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All segments showed similar rates of voter registration, with a bit 
more registration in Low Use counties. High Use counties had more 
registered Republicans than other segments of the state, as well as 
greater numbers of Republicans versus Democrats. This might 
suggest that higher coverage is more associated with Republican 
politics. I should caution, however, that my analysis is not 
comprehensive enough to support more than a tentative observation. 
Two of the Rich Four counties are Democratic, for example. Nevada, 
which has an extremely low percentage of its population in prison, is 
Republican.126 
Intra-county distribution might affect policy, in that a county 
might have Democratic cities within counties, or particular seats on 
the county council. Slates for county officials specify not just party, 
but person, and individual differences on criminal justice might 
account for some of the observed results. Finally, individual county 
council seats are drawn within counties and might heighten the 
effects of how Democrats and Republicans are distributed within the 
county.127 
F.   Reverse Causality: Is Low Crime the Product of a High NFA? 
In this Part, I consider whether I have been analyzing the problem 
backwards. I have analyzed whether prison is a product of crime. 
Perhaps, though, crime is a product of prison. That would mean the 
low crime rates associated with high NFA are an indicator that prison 
works. Under this theory, because offenders in High Use counties are 
subject to swift and certain punishment, this means both that there are 
fewer of them left to offend (incapacitation) and that any remaining 
offenders are less likely to risk prison (deterrence). 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “All Data noStwd as #s filter”). 
 127. For an evaluation of the role of party politics in sentencing commissions, see Rachel Barkow & 
Kathleen O’Neil, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and 
Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973 (2006). For an evaluation of the effect of elections on 
District Attorneys, see Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581 
(2009). 
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In response, I note first that it is not logically necessary that a 
decrease in crime is a sign that incarceration is working and an 
increase in crime means more prisons are needed. It could just as 
easily be said that a decrease in crime is a sign that fewer prisons are 
needed and an increase in crime is a sign that incarceration is not 
working.128 I will not attempt to determine whether changes in prison 
usage are, in fact, the cause of changes in crime. I do, however, note 
that this is the subject of vociferous—and voluminous—academic 
debate.129 I note also that, to hearken back to the comparison of 
Alameda and San Bernardino, crime rates in particular High Use 
counties might be the same as those in counties which have not used 
prison. 
I will, instead, frame the problems in terms of the central question 
of this paper. Even if one were to assume that the causation in fact 
runs from prison to crime, and that High Use policies are effective, 
then why should the state pay for it? The choice is made in the 
county, and the benefits go to the county. If the policies are, in fact, 
effective, then the counties should be happy to pay for it. 
Alternatively, if the state pays for prison because it believes the 
policy is worth subsidizing as a means of fighting crime, which 
counties should it pay for? Can it afford to subsidize all counties at 
High Use rates? Should it subsidize just prison, or should it subsidize 
other policy choices as well? I discuss these and other issues in the 
following section, which discusses the state’s role in funding prisons. 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 16 (2007) (noting that between 1973 and 2004 the total 
United States prison population rose every year (an aggregate total of 400 percent), while, during that 
time, there were about an equal number of years of rising and falling crime). 
 129. See, e.g., William Spelman, Specifying the Relationship Between Crime and Prisons, 24 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 149, 149 (2008) (surveying several quantitative studies and finding that, 
“[d]espite many years of study, the effect of prisons on crime remains a controversial question”). There 
is a more accessible introduction to this debate. See Alfred Blumstein & James Q. Wilson, The Impact of 
Incarceration on Crime: Two National Experts Weigh In, PEW CTR. ON STATES, Apr. 2008, available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Crime%20Incarceration%20QA.pdf. 
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IV. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS 
This Part examines the fiscal ramifications of the state prison 
subsidy. Given that the state pays for prison, and that counties use 
prisons at different rates, what is the net prison subsidy (or tax) for 
counties? I have heretofore adverted to the idea of subsidy without 
mentioning the numbers. This Part details exactly what those 
numbers are: they run into the hundreds of millions of dollars each 
year for just the first year of NFA sentences. In addition to exploring 
what state prison expenditures are, I also calculate what prison 
expenditures might be if California emulated the High Use counties 
or the Low Use ones. I also calculate what would happen if a single 
segment of the state moved to another segment’s coverage rates. 
There we see that if Los Angeles County alone moved to a High Use 
coverage rate, for example, the fiscal impacts would be substantial. 
A.   Subsidy by Segment 
The following table calculates prison subsidies in the manner 
described earlier.130 I multiplied the coverage rate by the number of 
violent crimes in a segment to come up with the “fair” or “justified” 
NFA number. I then subtracted this number from actual NFA and 
multiplied the result by per capita prison costs to arrive at the NFA 
surplus. I also calculated the subsidy on the basis of property crime 
coverage and Part I coverage, to see if an NFA rate not justified on 
the basis of violent crime might be justified by some other measure 
of crime. 
Table 18: Prison Subsidy by Segment, Average Yearly Values, 
2000–2009 
 High 
Use 
Low Use Los 
Angeles 
Middle 
Use 
State Total 
NFA 17,028 8,311 13,888 5,045 44,272 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
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Coverage 35.90% 
 
14.60% 
 
18.78% 27.58% 
 
22.52% 
 
Violent Crime 47,427 56,929 73,956 18,293 196,604 
 
NFA if at State 
Coverage Rate 
10,734 12,982 16,406 4,150 N/A 
NFA Surplus 
(Deficit) 
6,294 -4,671 -2,518 895 N/A 
Average yearly 
Subsidy 
(millions) 
$210.05 -$166.30 -$72.73 $28.97 N/A 
Highest 
Individual 
Yearly County 
Subsidy 
(Millions) 
$68.78 $5.23 $.97 $12.92 N/A 
Lowest 
Individual 
Yearly County 
Subsidy 
(Millions) 
-$.32 -$85.90 -$145.04 -$5.79 N/A 
Property 
Coverage 
Subsidy 
(millions) 
$122.10 -$201.64 $64.86 $14.67 N/A 
Part I coverage 
Subsidy 
(millions) 
$123.52 -$201.81 $71.66 $6.62 N/A 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are gross 
numbers. High and Low Subsidy figures refer to individual counties 
within the respective groups.131 
 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”, columns BD (NFA), 
EJ (Coverage), (G) Violent Crime, EM (NFA at State Coverage Rate), EO (Average subsidy—divided 
by 10), EZ (Property Coverage), FV (Part I coverage subsidy)). 
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California pays an immense amount of money to subsidize the 
violent-crime-unjustified prison usage of High Use counties, an 
average of $210 million a year. I emphasize that these figures are not 
the cost of a county’s total NFA, but just the NFA not justified by 
reported violent crime. Total NFA costs are much higher. Even 
focusing solely on surplus NFA, individual counties used huge sums 
of state resources: San Bernardino’s surplus prison use was 
subsidized an average of $51 million a year, with a high of almost 
$69 million in 2006. These figures, again, only calculate the cost of 
the first year of imprisonment of NFA for that particular year, and 
only for the number of NFA exceeding that justified by the statewide 
violent crime coverage rate.132 During the ten years of the study, only 
one of the eighteen High Use counties had a negative subsidy. Fresno 
had a single year (2000) in which its prison usage was not subsidized 
(-$320,000). Overall, however, Fresno’s excess prison usage cost the 
state an average of more than $15 million a year between 2000 and 
2009. 
Low Use counties left millions of dollars of prison resources on 
the table. If they had incarcerated at the statewide coverage rate, they 
would have used, on average, an extra $166 million in prison 
resources in the first year of NFA sentences. The difference between 
the cost of High Use deviations from the state average and Low Use 
deviations is more than $375 million a year, a tremendous transfer of 
resources from one-third of the state to another. Individual Low Use 
counties forewent huge amounts of crime-justified prison resources. 
Alameda County used an average of $48 million dollars less than its 
justified amount, with a high (or low) of -$85 million in 2008. 
(Again, this estimate only includes the cost of the first year of 
imprisonment for each new felon admission.) Estimates of Low Use 
counties as a segment are somewhat dampened by the inclusion of 
San Diego, which was in the top quartile for subsidies for two years 
(though its average annual subsidy was -$8.5 million). 
                                                                                                                 
 132. I note that the mean NFA sentence statewide is just over four and a half years, and the median is 
two years, suggesting that the actual cost of NFA might be much greater. Note, however, that new 
felons in Low Use counties are sentenced to slightly longer median prison terms. See infra Table 20 and 
accompanying text. 
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Los Angeles County was also on the losing end of the prison 
subsidy, averaging a -$72 million subsidy for the ten years of the 
study. Los Angeles spent the first five years of the past decade in the 
-$100 million range, hitting a peak of -$145 million in 2003 before 
dropping to -$96 million in 2004. The rest of the decade saw the Los 
Angeles subsidy numbers increase as Los Angeles’s coverage rates 
increased, a product both of decreasing violent crime and increased 
NFA. Los Angeles had a positive net subsidy of $970,000 in 2009. 
The Middle Use counties were subsidized overall, and I note again 
the heterogeneity of the group. More than half of the Middle Use 
counties were subsidized in nine or more years of the study.133 
Table 18 also calculates subsidies according to alternative 
coverage rates. If prison is justified on the basis of something other 
than reported violent crime, are the subsidy numbers different? The 
answer depends on which segment of the state one looks at. High Use 
counties look a little less high use when coverage is calculated using 
either reported property crimes or reported Part I crimes. Their 
subsidy drops to a yearly average of about $122 million, a little more 
than $70 million less than the yearly violent crime subsidy. Low Use 
counties, however, see their prison resource shortfall grow, dropping 
to below $200 million. These numbers can be explained by reference 
to the relatively high property and Part I crime rates in both High and 
Low Use counties. High property and Part I crime justifies more of 
the High Use counties’ NFA and increases the amount of prison 
resources left unused by the Low Use counties. 
Perhaps the most interesting result of recalculating coverage by 
property and Part I crime, though, is that Los Angeles goes from 
being a net donor to a net recipient of unjustified prison resources. 
Remember, Los Angeles County’s NFA rate is high on a straight per 
capita basis—it is low only when adjusted for its high violent crime 
rate. Because Los Angeles does not suffer from relatively high 
property and Part I crime, however, its high NFA rate is no longer 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Amador, Del Norte, Mariposa, San Luis Obispo, Siskiyou, and Tulare were subsidized in nine of 
the ten years; Humboldt, Madera, Tuolomne, Ventura, Yolo and Yuba were subsidized all ten years. 
They were not included in the High Use group, however, because the extent of their NFA surplus was 
not sufficiently large to put them in the top quartile of the state. 
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justified when adjusted for these types of crimes. Once again, the 
measure of subsidy is ultimately a normative question: what prison 
admissions are justified, and on what basis? 
 
Table 19: Prison Subsidies for High Use Counties, Average 
Yearly Values, 2000–2009 
 High 
Coverage 
High NFA 
Surplus 
Rich Four Poor Four High 
Coverage 
and NFA 
Surplus 
Average 
Raw NFA 
Numbers 
Per Year 
329 15,284 5,491 9,793 1,415 
Coverage 54.61% 34.45% 33.72% 34.88% 57.46% 
Violent 
Crime 
Raw 
Numbers 
603 44,361 16,284 28,077 2,463 
NFA if at 
State 
Coverage 
Rate 
138 10,030 3,674 6,357 566 
Excess 
NFA 
192 5,254 1,817 3,436 849 
Average 
yearly 
Subsidy 
(millions) 
$6.36 $175.37 $60.85 $114.52 $28.32 
Highest 
Individual 
Yearly 
Subsidy 
$3.85 $68.78 $55.39 $68.78 $14.84 
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(millions) 
Lowest 
Individual 
Yearly 
Subsidy 
(millions) 
$.01 -$.32 $1.16 -$.32 $2.51 
Property 
Coverage 
Subsidy 
(millions) 
$5.81 $91.29 $28.27 $63.02 $25.00 
Part I 
coverage 
Subsidy 
(millions) 
$5.95 $92.85 $17.37 $75.48 $24.71 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are gross 
(non-normalized) numbers. High and Low Subsidy values are for 
individual counties within the respective groups. Figures might not 
add due to rounding.134 
 
Table 19 takes a closer look at just the subsidized counties. The 
Poor Four dominate here, sending, in an average year, 3,436 excess 
new felons (those sent above the number calculated at the state 
coverage rate). These prisoners cost an average of $115 million in 
just the first year of their incarceration, and the state must pay for this 
cost every year. The Rich Four also cost the state large sums of 
money on the NFA they send above the state coverage rate. Two rich 
counties in particular receive large subsidies: Santa Clara and 
Orange, both of which received eight digit subsidies each year, an 
average of more than $16 million for Santa Clara and $36 million for 
Orange. The state pays for the prison sentences of these crime-
unjustified prisoners even though, each year, the average citizen in 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Stats by County Segment”, columns BD (NFA), 
EJ (Coverage), (G) Violent Crime, EM (NFA at State Coverage Rate), EO (Average subsidy—divided 
by 10), EZ (Property Coverage), FV (Part I coverage subsidy)). 
78
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/4
2012] TOUGH ON CRIME 1065 
these counties makes at least $4,000 more than the average 
Californian. 
B.   The Role of Sentence Lengths 
In this Part, I take a second cut at costs, examining sentence 
lengths. As I have stated repeatedly, my cost estimates heretofore 
have only considered the first year of confinement. To get a better 
estimate of the cost of a given county’s prison usage, one must also 
take sentence length into account.135 It might be the case that High 
Use counties nevertheless use fewer prison resources than Low Use 
counties because they send people to prison for shorter terms. Of 
course, it might also be the case that High Use counties use an even 
greater amount of prison resources if they not only send more people 
to prison but send them there for a longer time. 
I again used data from the CDCR’s OIS branch. I used data on all 
individual sentences and crimes for each county from 2000 to 2009 
to calculate total prison years for each county and each set of 
counties. I also looked at total prison years for certain subsets of 
crime (e.g. Violent Crime, Property Crime, Part I Crime), again using 
FBI typology. I divided these numbers by NFA to get the mean 
sentence. I also calculated the median sentence for total NFA, given 
potential distorting effects of lengthy sentences. In fact, just .16% of 
the total statewide number of sentences—the 746 sentences greater 
than or equal to 100 years—accounts for approximately seven 
percent of the total time sentenced from 2000–2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Of course, these are just estimates of the time prisoners will spend in prison. Actual time served 
depends on other factors (e.g. mortality levels in prison). 
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Table 20: Sentence Length by Segment, 2000–2009136 
 High 
Use 
Low Use Los 
Angeles 
Middle Use State Total 
Segment 
NFA as % 
of State 
Total 
38.78% 19.21% 30.75% 11.22% N/A 
Segment 
Sentence 
Years as 
% of State 
Total 
34.65% 22.01% 31.78%
  
11.56% N/A 
Median 
(Mean) 
Sentence 
in Years 
2 (4.14) 2.67 (5.31) 2 (4.79) 3 (4.75) 2 (4.63) 
Violent 
Crime 
Median 
(Mean) 
Sentence 
Years 
4 (9.25) 5 (11.03) 5 (11.24) 5 (9.88) 5 (10.42) 
 
Property 
Crime 
Median 
(Mean) 
Sentence 
Years 
2 (2.74) 2 (3.08) 2 (2.66) 2 (3.35) 2 (2.84) 
Part I 
Crime 
Median 
2 (5.31) 2 (6.69) 2.67 (6.40) 3 (6.11) 2.67 (6.05) 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See BALL, supra note 87. Mean sentence data (calculated) begins at cell N90228. Median figures 
were calculated manually, filtering by months. 
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(Mean) 
Sentence 
Years 
Drug 
Crime 
Median 
(Mean) 
Sentence 
Years 
2 (2.71) 2.67 (3.17) 2 (2.87) 2.67 (3.20) 2 (2.89) 
Sex 
Offense 
Median 
(Mean) 
Sentence 
Years 
3 (10.56) 5 (12.64) 3 (9.11) 5 (10.46) 3.67 (10.66) 
 
Other 
Violent 
Crime 
Median 
(Mean) 
Sentence 
Years 
2 (4.58) 3 (5.53) 3 (6.35) 3 (4.85) 3 (5.23) 
Other 
Property 
Crime 
Median 
(Mean) 
Sentence 
Years 
2 (2.25) 2 (2.52) 2 (2.23) 2 (2.60) 2 (2.33) 
Other 
Offense 
Median 
(Mean) 
Sentence 
Years 
2 (2.56) 2 (2.85) 2 (2.54) 2 (2.90) 2 (2.65) 
81
Ball: Tough on Crime (On The State’s Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1068 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures based on ten-
year totals provided by the CDCR OIS. Crime categories based on 
FBI definitions. 
 
My conclusion is that sentence lengths are more or less uniform—
it is not the case that High Use and Low Use counties (or any 
segment of the state, for that matter), impose remarkably divergent 
median sentences from one another. The data is relatively uniform: 
total new felon admission percentages by segment are roughly 
comparable to total years sentenced by segment. That is, counties 
send people and sentence them at roughly similar proportions of the 
state total, although it should be noted that Low Use counties do 
impose slightly longer mean sentences than High Use ones. This 
could be due to lengthy sentences on the top end, or it could be 
consistent with the observation in Table 9 (Offender Mix) that Low 
Use counties use prison for more serious offenders.137 An initial cut, 
removing just those prisoners sentenced to serve more than 100 
years, does slightly narrow the gap between the two segments.138 One 
conclusion I draw from this data is that, in some ways, sentencing 
reform has worked—there is uniformity across the state, in that 
offense X generally gets sentence Y. The issue, however, is that there 
are few substantive limits on officials’ ability to charge offense X. 
This might suggest that any future changes to statewide laws should 
focus less on harmonizing the time associated with particular crimes 
and more on harmonizing counties’ abilities to charge offenses. This 
could be done by mandatory charging (harmonizing counties on a 
higher level of incarceration), by reducing the number of substantive 
offenses (harmonizing counties on a lower level of incarceration), or 
some combination of the two. Realignment, discussed in Part V, 
infra, tends toward the latter approach. 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Note, for example, that High Use counties, which have greater percentages of “Other Violent” 
offenders, have a median sentence length of a year less than anywhere else in the state. 
 138. New figures for NFA percentage are roughly unchanged (38.79, 19.19, 30.75, and 11.27 for 
High, Low, Los Angeles, Middle, and State, respectively), while percentage of total sentence length 
increases slightly for High Use and drops slightly for Low Use (34.75, 21.62, 31.97, and 11.65 percent 
respectively). 
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Ultimately, any differences in time sentenced might reflect real 
differences in the crimes themselves. That is, some offenses might 
get greater or lesser amounts of time because of qualitative 
differences in the crimes themselves, not just policy decisions. I 
speak not only of statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating 
factors, but the heinousness of the offense.139 This is why, ultimately, 
the comparison of offenses to one another must take place at a certain 
level of generality and imprecision. Some differences in sentence 
length might be because offenses are genuinely different from one 
another, and some differences might be because counties (and their 
policies) are genuinely different from one another. But in any given 
case, it is nearly impossible to tell which dominates,140 which is why 
this analysis has generally not focused on sentence lengths. 
C.   Recalculating State Coverage Rates by Segment 
What would happen if other segments of the state began acting like 
one another? I consider a variety of scenarios. First, I calculate what 
would happen if the state coverage rate were replaced with the 
coverage rate of each of the four segments. Even though the resulting 
figures include only the first year of each new felon’s sentence, the 
results would be dramatic, ranging from an additional cost of $879 
million to a cut of more than half a billion dollars. Second, I calculate 
what would happen if only individual segments of the state changed 
their coverage rates. This analysis shows that changing just parts of 
California could have profound fiscal impacts. 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 288–89 (2007) (holding that statutorily enumerated 
factors must be charged and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt). This governed California 
sentencing in the later years of the study, although it is unclear what practical effect this might have had. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65 (“real offense discussion”). For a further exploration 
of this issue, see Ball, supra note 41. 
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Table 21: Subsidy Recalculated with Changed Statewide 
Coverage Rate, by Segment, Average Yearly Values, 2000–
2009141 
 High Use Low Use Los Angeles Middle Use State Total 
Coverage 35.90% 14.60% 
 
18.78% 27.58% 
 
22.52% 
 
State NFA if at 
Segment 
Coverage Rate 
70,581 28,704 36,922 54,223 44,272 
Excess NFA 26,309 -15,568 -7,350 9,951 N/A 
Change in Cost 
(millions) 
$879.28 -$520.31 -$245.65 $332.58 N/A 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are gross 
numbers per year. High and Low Subsidy values are for individual 
counties within the respective groups. 
 
One thing is immediately apparent from Table 21: the state cannot 
afford for all counties to act like High Use counties. If the state 
incarcerated at the High Use coverage rate, it would cost an 
additional $879 million each year for just the first year of new felons’ 
sentences. The state would also have to find room in its already 
overcrowded prisons to house an additional 26,309 incoming 
prisoners each year. The state could, however, shed an average of 
more than 15,000 inmates if it adopted Low Use coverage rates 
statewide. In doing so, it would save more than $500 million in the 
cost of the first year of new felons’ sentences. 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Statewide All Data”). 
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Table 22: Change in NFA with Changed Segment Coverage 
Rate, by Segment, Average Yearly Values, 2000–2009142 
 High Use Low Use Los Angeles Rich Four Poor Four 
Segment 
Changes to 
High Use 
Coverage 
Rate 
N/A 12, 127 12,662 355 287 
Segment 
Changes to 
Low Use 
Coverage 
Rate 
-10,104 N/A -3,090 -3,114 -5,694 
Segment 
Changes to 
Los Angeles 
Coverage 
Rate 
-8,121 2,380 N/A -2,433 -4,520 
Segment 
Changes to 
Middle Use 
Coverage 
Rate 
-3,948 7,390 6,509 -1,000 -2,049 
Segment 
Changes to 
State 
Average 
Coverage 
Rate 
-6,347 4,509 2,767 -1,824 -3,470 
Bold: highest value; Italics: lowest value. All figures are gross 
numbers per year. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See TOUGH CHART DATA, supra note 27 (tab “Segment Coverage Change”). 
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Even if the state were not to change as a whole, just changing a 
segment of the state—or just the Rich and Poor Four—could have 
significant impacts on prison space and prison budgets. If the High 
Use counties changed their coverage rates to the state average, the 
state would immediately save an average of more than 6,300 prison 
beds in the first year alone (plus additional projected bed space in 
following years for inmates serving multi-year sentences). If the Poor 
Four counties alone changed to the state average, the state would 
save an average of almost 3,500 prison beds. In fact, if the Poor Four 
adopted the coverage rate of any of the other segments (besides that 
of the High Use counties), the state would save millions of dollars 
and thousands of prison beds. Alternatively, if the Low Use 
counties—or just Los Angeles County—begin to emulate the High 
Use counties, the state would face even more crowded prisons—more 
than 24,000 prisoners each year (an effect that would be compounded 
by sentences of more than one year). 
With this diagnosis, what can California do to change coverage 
rates and prison usage, or at least to account for them? The next 
section sketches out some answers to that question. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
California faces many challenges relating to its overcrowded 
prisons. Once we understand that California’s counties are different 
when it comes to prison use, what are the policy implications? What 
would happen if California’s policymakers understood that counties 
are different—and that a county’s use of prison might be the result of 
policy choices, not responses to crime? What effect would it have on 
policies to promote prison population reductions? I examine three 
possibilities: realignment, probation subsidies, and sentencing. 
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A.   Realignment, Prisoner Release 
California must cut its prison population by approximately 37,000 
inmates143 within the next two years144 or federal courts will order it 
to release prisoners. Recently, the California Assembly passed 
legislation to “realign” criminal justice, shifting more responsibilities 
from the state to counties.145 As the state moves to redefine its 
relationship to the counties, the county analysis in this Article might 
be useful in blunting the criticism that the state is pushing its problem 
onto the counties. With High Use counties, it might be argued that 
the state is simply returning the problem to those counties. The state 
has thus far given no indication that it will attempt to tailor 
realignment to individual counties, but ideally, it would tailor its 
responses to High and Low Use counties and demand more of the 
former than the latter. 
A second way this analysis might help is in the implementation of 
realignment, particularly when it comes to setting benchmarks of 
current versus desired prison usage. As I have stated, prison usage 
per capita—whether total prison population or NFA—is too crude a 
measure of prison need. Tying realignment benchmarks and/or 
funding to current usage would merely lock in the existing subsidy, 
rewarding (in perpetuity) counties which choose prison—and not 
other options—as a response to crime. In some ways, in fact, tying 
benchmarks for new reforms to existing prison usage is ironic: it 
treats overcrowding by rewarding those counties most responsible for 
it. Yet funding for the first nine months of realignment makes this 
very mistake: Alameda is getting $9,219,946 of the realignment 
budget, while San Bernardino is getting more than twice that 
amount—$25,785,695—even though they have similar crime 
problems.146 The only difference is that San Bernardino uses prison 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
 144. Id. at 1945. The Supreme Court did, however, strongly hint that the three-judge panel should 
extend the timeline if the state requests it. Id. at 1946–47. 
 145. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
 146. These figures were disseminated by the Chief Probation Officers of California on their website. 
CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CAL., AB 109 ALLOCATION REFINEMENTS (2011), available at 
http://www.cpoc.org/php/realign/ab109fiscal/AB%20109%20Allocation%20Refinements%20for%2006
2411.xls. There is no clear information on exactly how these figures were calculated, and the long-term 
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much more than Alameda. Using per capita prison usage does not 
eliminate the prison subsidy, it merely shifts it to another part of the 
ledger. 
The state should, instead, tie realignment benchmarks to the 
violent crime coverage rate. This would allow for flexibility in letting 
counties imprison greater numbers in response to local outbreaks of 
reported violent crime, while tying state subsidies for prison usage to 
its most persuasive justification: crime.147 Violent crimes are readily 
reported, and because higher crime rates are political poison, counties 
have disincentives to game them. It is unlikely that localities would 
risk the political discontent from rising crime rates in order to reserve 
more prison resources for themselves. 
Finally, one thing that has gotten lost in the realignment 
discussion—and in this Article—is the relative size of the county and 
state in criminal justice. Prison subsidies figures are sizeable, but 
they are dwarfed by local criminal justice budgets. I added statewide 
                                                                                                                 
funding formula was deliberately left unresolved. See MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S 
OFFICE, 2011 REALIGNMENT: ADDRESSING ISSUES TO PROMOTE ITS LONG-TERM SUCCESS (2011), 
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/stadm/realignment/realignment_081911.pdf. For the 
first nine months of AB 109, however, the amount counties received was calculated as follows: 60 
percent of the total was given based on a county’s adult daily population in prison, 30 percent was based 
on total population of adults (18–64) as a percentage of the state population, and 10 percent was based 
on a county’s performance on SB 678, a bill which established performance-based funding for county 
probation subsidies. EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 2012-13, at 74 (2012), 
available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf (describing how 
the county funding allocation involves three factors: “the estimates of the number of offenders who 
would be under the jurisdiction of each county, each county’s population between the ages of 18 to 64, 
and a county’s success under the felony probation program initiated under Chapter 608, Statues of 2009 
(SB 678).”). 
I note that Fresno and San Francisco Counties, among many others, present similar differences. During 
the period of this study, Fresno County and San Francisco County had similar population sizes, and 
even though San Francisco suffered from greater levels of violent crime, Fresno sent 2½ to 7 times as 
many people to prison each year, and had between 2 and 3 times the number of people in prison. 
Fresno’s initial realignment funding is $8,838,319; San Francisco County’s is $5,049,763. CHIEF PROB. 
OFFICERS OF CAL., supra. Realignment is, of course, not the only area in which the state funds prison 
population rather than prison need: a bill passed in May to reimburse counties for building local jail 
facilities would “give funding preference to counties that committed the largest percentage of inmates to 
state custody in relation to the total population of CDCR in 2010.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 15820.917 
(West 2011). 
 147. The state/local funding relationship in California is incredibly complex, however, due to a series 
of ballot initiatives restricting the county’s ability to raise funds and the state’s ability to mandate 
programs that would require county expenditures. See, e.g., MAC TAYLOR, supra note 146, at 8–15 
(noting the current restrictions and the difficulty of providing counties with flexible block grants). 
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budget figures for local law enforcement (sheriffs and police), jail, 
and probation to get an approximation of the amount of money spent 
locally on criminal justice—though these figures in particular do not 
include the budget for the county’s chief law enforcement official, 
the District Attorney. I then added a county’s imputed gross prison 
budget (total prison population times per capita prisoner cost) to 
these budget figures. The result gives a total measure of county 
criminal justice costs. Prisons are only one quarter of this total 
amount. Counties have, on average, three times the criminal justice 
resources available in-county that the state spends on its behalf for 
imprisonment. Prisoners in state facilities are not the largest part of 
county criminal justice. They never have been. I say this only to give 
the financial concerns about realignment their proper context. 
B.   De-Subsidizing Prison, Re-Subsidizing Probation 
The state could create two incentive mechanisms to encourage 
High Use counties to lower their coverage rates—and to encourage 
Low Use counties not to raise theirs. The first would be to decrease 
the relative cost of in-county dispositions. The second would be to 
increase the cost of prison usage. 
Lowering the cost of in-county dispositions means expanding 
financial support for diversion programs (such as those aimed at drug 
abusers or the mentally ill), jail construction, and probation. As noted 
earlier, jail bed numbers can increase without new construction if 
counties relied less on bail and released more of the arraigned on 
their own recognizance.148 The state could encourage this—or 
mandate it—through, inter alia, changes to statutes or the uniform 
bail schedule, by subsidizing the bail bond market, or subsidizing 
electronic monitoring. The state could also subsidize probation, as, 
indeed, it did until the mid-1970’s.149 The state would need to ensure 
that subsidies kept pace with actual costs to the county, and it could 
build political will by framing the costs to the state in terms of money 
saved on prison usage. Any program must tie funding to measurable 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 149. See, e.g., Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 63 (2008). 
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outcomes to ensure that the programs actually reduce the strain on 
the state’s prisons. Otherwise, the state will be spending money 
without saving it. 
The second option, charging counties for surplus prison usage, is 
more policy neutral. Whereas probation subsidies might encourage 
an uptake in the gross numbers of people in the criminal justice 
system (or at least make it more affordable), charging for prison 
usage would be more narrowly targeted at reducing unjustified use. 
California actually used capitation fees in its successful drive to 
decrease the state’s youth prison population.150 The state charged 
counties per a rate schedule inverted with the seriousness of offense: 
the state charged counties a lower day rate to house more serious 
offenders and a higher day rate to house less serious offenders.151 The 
capitation rate policy has not been tried with adult prison 
populations, however.152 
C.   State Population Control and Determinate Sentencing 
Although I have stated that prison overpopulation is largely a 
county problem, and, accordingly, that statewide solutions generally 
miss the mark, I nevertheless have one recommendation for 
sentencing reform. The difference is that my suggestion is not on the 
charging side, but on the release side. The state should explore the 
reintroduction of indeterminate sentences—those sentences 
terminating in a discretionary parole release decision—on a wider 
basis as a means of prison population control. In an indeterminate 
system, the state can release prisoners to parole at times of crowding; 
determinate sentences means the state has no such leeway. In some 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See, e.g., LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: REALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES 
4 (2008), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/192/report192.pdf. 
 151. Id. There is some evidence, however, that counties have changed their charging practices and 
have simply increased the number of adult criminal court filings in response. See, e.g., DANIEL 
MACALLAIR ET AL., CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF REALIGNMENT ON 
COUNTY JUVENILE JUSTICE PRACTICE: WILL CLOSING STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 
INCREASE ADULT CRIMINAL COURT FILINGS? (2011), available at 
http://www.cjcj.org/files/The_impact_of_realignment_on_county_juvenile_justice_practice.pdf. 
 152. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 212 (describing a policy of “surcharg[ing] 
units of local government for additional offenders referred to state prisons” but noting that “we know of 
no American jurisdiction where this has been seriously proposed or considered”). 
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ways, then, indeterminate sentencing systems allow the state to push 
back on county decisions by controlling release decisions. In 
determinate systems, the state has no such power. 
California moved to determinate sentencing in 1975. Before then, 
the state had some control when to release an offender, even though 
it never controlled who was sent there. Now the state doesn’t have 
any control. The only population variable is who goes to prison under 
what charge, both of which are determined long before the state has 
custody. There is a large amount of discretion with inputs to the 
prison system—all of it at the county level or below—and none on 
the state side with release. 153 
Of course, I am well aware of the problems with some forms of 
indeterminate sentencing, as I have demonstrated elsewhere.154 I 
would not support the introduction of fully discretionary, unguided, 
haphazard indeterminate sentencing. Instead, the state should go one 
of two ways: set statewide standards on risk and enforce them 
system-wide, or acknowledge the role of community differences and 
break up the state system entirely. I have already written about the 
former point;155 my next Article takes on the latter.156 
*** 
California is one state; it is also fifty-eight counties. When it 
comes to criminal justice and the state prison population, localities 
are where the action is. County criminal justice budgets are much 
larger than prison budgets, county officials make most of the key 
decisions, and county responses to crime—not crime itself—drive 
new felon admission rates. Alameda and San Bernardino are very 
similar when it comes to criminal justice except in their usage of 
prison. It is hard to understand why the tax revenues from Alameda’s 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. at 212 (“Eliminating or reducing the power of parole boards over the release of prisoners 
removed a significant means of controlling prison population from that level of government responsible 
for the cost of the prison system.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 63 (describing California’s current parole release system as “less a 
form of parole release than a form of parole retention”). See also W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, 
and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COL. L. REV. 893 
(2009). 
 155. See Ball, supra note 63. 
 156. See Ball, supra note 41. 
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residents should go towards paying for San Bernardino’s choices. I 
am not suggesting that the case cannot be made; I am, however, 
saying that on the basis of crime, the case has not been made.157 
I want to emphasize, again, that this study is subject to several 
limitations. Measuring prison usage in terms of violent crime is a 
choice I made in designing the study, not a result of it. I have no 
smoking gun evidence that prison usage is a policy choice; I have 
only evidence that higher prison usage is not the result of higher 
crime. Ultimately, the conclusion of this study is that counties are 
different. The difficult question that remains is which of those 
differences the state should subsidize, if any. 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Perhaps Alameda receives a greater share of other state resources that evens out with San 
Bernardino’s greater share of prison resources. 
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GLOSSARY 
APAR—Adult Population at Risk. The subset of a county 
population between the ages of 18 and 69. 
 
Coverage—NFA as a percentage of violent crime. This is a proxy 
variable for the degree to which a county responds to crime with 
incarceration. 
 
High Use—Counties with annual coverage rates and/or NFA 
surplus in the top quartile for at least 7 of the 10 years of the study. 
 
High Five—The subset of low coverage/NFA deficit counties with 
relatively high per capita incomes: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, 
San Francisco, and Santa Cruz 
 
Low Six—The subset of low coverage/NFA deficit counties with 
relatively low per capita incomes: Imperial, Nevada, Sacramento, 
San Joaquin, Sonoma, and Stanislaus. 
 
Low Use—Counties with annual coverage rates and/or NFA 
deficits in the bottom quartile for at least 7 of the 10 years of the 
study. 
 
NFA—new felon admissions, prisoners entering prison upon 
conviction or plea of a new felony charge. Distinguished from other 
entrants to the prison system, such as those who have had their parole 
revoked or parolees admitted with a new term (as a result of a new 
crime). 
 
Poor Four—The four high-NFA-surplus counties with below-
average per capita incomes: Fresno, Kern, Riverside, and San 
Bernardino. 
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Rich Four—The four high-NFA-surplus counties with above-
average per capita incomes: Orange, Placer, Santa Barbara, and Santa 
Clara. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF COUNTY SEGMENTS 
High Use 
High Coverage High NFA Surplus Both 
Colusa  Fresno   Butte 
Glenn  Kern   Kings 
Inyo   Orange  Shasta 
Lake  Placer   Sutter 
Lassen  Riverside   
Trinity  San Bernardino 
   Santa Barbara   
Santa Clara 
 
Low Use 
Low Coverage NFA Deficit   Both 
Alpine  (Los Angeles)  Alameda 
San Benito  San Diego  Contra Costa 
      Imperial 
      Marin 
      Nevada 
Sacramento 
San Francisco 
San Joaquin 
Santa Cruz 
Sonoma 
Stanislaus 
 
Middle Use 
Amador, Calaveras, Del Norte, El Dorado, Humboldt, Madera, 
Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa, 
Plumas, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Sierra, Siskiyou, Solano, 
Tehama, Tulare, Tuolumne, Ventura, Yolo, Yuba. 
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF COUNTY SEGMENTS 
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